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BEING COMPETITIVE IN A "REREGULATED"
BANKING ENVIRONMENT: THE CASE OF
COMMERCIAL LENDING ACTIVITIES OF BANKING
INSTITUTIONSt
JOSEPH JUDE NORTON*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Banking institutions' are subject to a "dual" regulatory
system of state and federal regulations, with the federal system fragmented among various regulators.2 This multiplicity
t The genesis of this article stems from a paper presented at an Oklahoma City
University School of Law conference entitled "Commercial Lending and Equipment
Leasing." A version of this article will appear as Chapter 4 in an upcoming treatise,
COMMERCIAL LENDING GUIDE, to be published by the Matthew Bender Co. in fall 1987.
Unless otherwise indicated, the state of the law reflected herein is as of September 1,
1986.
* LL.B. (hons.), LL.M., S.J.D., Professor of Banking Law, Southern Methodist
University.
1. Unless otherwise indicated, the term "banking institutions" includes commercial banks, thrift institutions (i.e., savings and loan associations) and bank or S&L
holding company units, with particular emphasis on federally regulated institutions.
2. See Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition In Regulation,
30 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1977).
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and pyramid of regulation complicates an institution's flexibility and ability to conduct commercial lending activities3 and
alternative commercial financing services 4 in an increasingly
competitive marketplace of financial intermediaries (many of
which are largely unregulated or, at least, subject to less regulation and fewer regulators). 5 This result is true even in a period of "deregulation" ' which seemingly is enhancing the competitive position of banking institutions through expanded
lending and investment powers, inasmuch as these expanded
powers have brought with them "reregulation" 7 and revamped
supervisory and enforcement procedures8 of the various regulators of these institutions. The primary objective of this article is to examine the scope and nature of the regulatory
framework for banking institutions regarding their commercial lending activities, in the context of the business need for
marketplace flexibility and the public need to "reregulate"
banking institutions to ensure the "safety and soundness" of
these institutions and of the banking system as a whole.
II.

OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT

To appreciate the full implications of the regulatory
framework for commercial lending activities, one should first
have an understanding of the fragmented system of regulation
for banking institutions, the legal dimensions of the bank deregulation, and the statutory scope of the lending and investment powers for such institutions.
3. On commercial lending practices by banking institutions, see, e.g., D.

HAYES,

BANK LENDING POLICIES (2d ed. 1977); G. HEMPEL, A COLEMAN & D. SIMONSON, BANK
MANAGEMENT, Part IV (2d ed. 1986); COMMERCIAL LOAN DOCUMENTATION GUIDE, Ch. 1

(J. Norton ed. to be published fall 1987) [hereinafter NORTON-CLG].
4. In an effort to reduce their risk exposure, banking institutions (particularly
the larger institutions) are shifting their emphasis from traditional commercial lending activities to more fee-generating and investment banking-type services. See infra
text accompanying notes 443-56.
5. See, e.g., Staff of House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess., Financial Institutions in a Revolutionary Era 1-7 (Comm. Print
1981).
6. On the legal aspects of deregulation, see, e.g., Norton, The 1982 Banking Act
and the "Deregulation"Scheme, 38 Bus. LAW. 1627 (1983).
7. See, e.g., Banking Law in the United States: Deregulation or Regulation?, 4
SOOCHow L. REv. 43 (1984).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 457-58.
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"Reregulated" Banking Environment
A.

The Regulatory Scheme

In order to determine the laws applicable to a specific
banking institution or "banking" function, it is important to
ascertain under which law the institution is chartered and the
responsible regulators:
1. Commercial Banks. The regulation of commercial
banks is as follows:
National banks are chartered and supervised by the Comptroller of the Currency (Comptroller), are members of the
Federal Reserve System (FRS) subject to Federal Reserve
Board of Governors (FRB) regulations and are insured by,
and subject to the regulation of, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
State chartered banks are regulated by the relevant state
bank authority and may choose to become members of the
FRS. If a state bank becomes a member of the FRS, it is
insured by the FDIC.
State banks may choose to be insured by the FDIC without
becoming members of the FRS.
Unless otherwise required by state law, which is the case in
most states, state banks may choose to operate independently from the FRS and the FDIC.
2. Savings and Loan Associations. The regulation of savings and loan associations (S&Ls) is as follows:
Federal S&Ls are chartered and supervised by the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), are members of the Federal Savings and Loan System (FSLS) and are insured by,
and subject to the regulations of, the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC).
State chartered S&Ls are regulated by the relevant state
banking authority or savings and loan department and may
choose to become members of the FSLS. In order to secure
membership in the FSLS, S&Ls must obtain FSLIC
insurance.
State chartered S&Ls may choose to be insured by the
FSLIC without becoming a member of the FSLS.
A state chartered S&L may choose not to be insured by the
FSLIC or to be a member of the FSLS.
9. See J. NORTON & S. WHITLEY, BANKING LAW MANUAL (1986);
OFFICER's HANDBOOK OF BANK REGULATION (1984 & Supp. 1986); and

S. HUBER, BANK
F. BEUTEL & M.
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The Deregulation Scheme

When one considers the legislative and regulatory environment for banking institutions and their lending functions,
a helpful approach is to try to fit these functions into the
overall context of the "deregulation scheme." During the past
decade there is probably no industry in the United States that
has experienced the accelerated structural changes as has the
banking industry. These changes have been brought about by
rapid and continuing technological changes, the development
of an increasingly sophisticated and interchangeable customer
base that requires an ongoing increase of new financial services, growing intra-industry competition between the traditionally segmented commercial banking industry and the
thrift institution industry, compressing competition from nonbank financial institutions in the search for new customer
base in the delivery of financial services, and at least until recently, unprecedented levels in volitality of interest rates that
in the thrift industry created a significant disintermediation
that compelled very substantial structural changes in the industry and that generated very substantial banking
legislation.1 0
In terms of the functional aspects of the deregulation
scheme, one is talking about (i) deregulation of the asset side
of a banking institution's balance sheet (i.e., an expansion of
the business opportunities and products services that can be
offered), (ii) deregulation of the liabilities-side of a banks balance sheet (i.e., expansion of depository sources, primarily
through the offering of new depository vehicles and through
elimination of traditional restrictions on the pricing of deposits) and (iii) deregulation of geographic restrictions on the
(5th ed. 1982 &
Supp. 1986). On the general nature of this fragmented regulatory system, see, e.g.,
SCHROEDER, BANK OFFICER'S HANDBOOK OF COMMERCIAL BANKING LAW

Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System, VA. L. REV. 565, 771 (pts. 1-2) (1966); Scott,
supra note 2; Blueprint for Reform: The Report of the Task Group on Regulation of
FinancialServices, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1050, at I (Nov. 16, 1984) [hereinafter Bush Report). On rationales and policies behind the chartering process, see, e.g.,
Carstersens, Regulating Banking in the Public Interest: The Case for an Open Approach to Charteringand Branching, 57 TEx. L. REV. 1085 (1979).
10. On background of bank deregulation, see, e.g., THE DEREGULATION OF THE
BANKING AND SECURITIES INDUSTRIES (L. Goldberg & L. White eds. 1979).

.1986]

"Reregulated" Banking Environment

intrastate and interstate activities of banking institutions."
These aspects of deregulation are important to banks and
their commercial lending functions because they touch upon
the scope of such institutions' lending powers, funding availability and geographic marketing of such lending and related
services.
Also, centrally related to this whole deregulation scheme
is the present inquiry concerning rationalization of the multiplicity of bank regulators, a matter without the scope of this
paper and recently addressed in the Bush Task Force Report. 2 Another central issue, the pressures for which may be
at times all too latent yet pervasive, yet at times the manifestations of which may be all too notorious (a la Penn Square,
Continental Illinois and United American Bank), is the interrelationship of deregulation to traditional banking objectives,
particularly sacred of which is the notion and legal requirement of "safety and soundness."'" The bank regulators are using "safety and soundness" concerns to revamp bank examination procedures, to revise loan classifications guidelines, to
enhance civil and criminal actions against banking institutions
and bank management for management, to reexamine the deposit insurance scheme, and to overhaul capital adequacy
rules and guidelines. 4 In summary, an understanding of the
functions of a banking institution requires comprehension of
the bank deregulation scheme and the internal and external
competitive forces faced by various types of banking institutions both federal and state.
11. See generally DEPARTMENT

OF THE TREASURY, GEOGRAPHIC RESTRICTIONS ON

COMMERCIAL BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES

(1981); supra note 5.

12. See Bush Report, supra note 9.
13. On basic "safety and soundness" concerns see, e.g., Edwards & Scott, Regu-

lating the Solvency of Depository Institutions, in

ISSUES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION

65

(Edwards ed. 1979); see also Safety and Soundness Will Be the Key Concern in 1986
as Congress Considers Changes in FinancialLaws, 46 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) No. 3,
at 130-37 (Jan. 20, 1986).
14. See, e.g., remarks by Senior Vice President (Supervision) for Federal Reserve
District Bank of Dallas, Mr. George C. Cochran, Developments in Safety and Soundness Concerns of Bank Regulators, SECOND ANNUAL SHORT COURSE ON LAW OF BANKING INSTITUTIONS (Dec. 2-6, 1985, Southern Methodist University School of Law).
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1. The Federal Environment
Federal bank regulation has traditionally restricted competition among banking institutions. 5 This was accomplished
by the performance of different functions by different institutions. Bank regulators also controlled depository interest rates
and, until recently, this control was exercised in a protective
manner.'" In addition, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act was
enacted to promote "safe and sound" banking practices and to
protect bank deposits through deposit insurance. 7 Further,
Congress geographically divided the banking industry pursuant to the McFadden Act 8 and restricted interstate banking
by passage of the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding
Company Act (BHCA)."9
The restrictions on competition among banking institutions are gradually being reduced. For example, the enactment of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (1980 Omnibus Banking Act) fosters
competition among banking institutions and (some may argue) reshapes the traditional banking objectives of "safety
and soundness. '2 0 This act fosters competition by granting
significant powers (including broadened lending powers), in
addition to those then presently exercised, to S&Ls and other
thrift institutions, by phasing out interest rate ceilings and
differentials on deposits and by preempting many of the state
usury laws. Most recently, the restrictions on competition
among banking institutions have been reduced further by the
passage of the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act
15. Compare Huck, What is the Banking Business? 21 Bus. LAW. 537 (the banking business consists of fundamental or incidental services); and Schweitzer, Banks
and Banking - A Review of a Definition, 94 BANKING L.J. 6 (1977) (banking functions should be defined by rational economic criteria rather than historical
description).
16. E.g., Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 10, 48 Stat. 181, 182 (1933) (amended
1982).
17. See The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act, ch. 967, § 2[1], 64 Stat.
873, (1950) (current version at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-32 (1986)).
18. See The McFadden Act, ch. 191, § 7, 44 Stat. 1228-29 (1927) (current version
at 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1982)).
19. See Douglas Amendment, ch. 240, § 3, 70 Stat. 134-35 (1956) (current version
at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982)).
20. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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of 1982 (the 1982 Banking Act).2 Significant pieces of additional bank legislation are pending before this Congress. In
sum, competition is being enhanced on the asset side and the
liability side of the balance sheet of all banking institutions.
In addition, the business opportunities of banking institutions are expanding through liberal interpretation of their "incidental powers" authority2 2 and through the use of related,
"non bank" corporate entities, such as service corporations,
23
generally within a holding company unit.
Bank regulation also has separated banking institutions
from non bank financial intermediaries. For example, the
Glass-Steagall Act separates commercial banking from investment banking.24 Nonbank financial intermediaries have been
taking advantage of this limitation on bank activities by offering an increasing array of financial and financing services, and
thereby competing for traditional bank customers (including
corporate customers of banks). For banking institutions,
Glass-Steagall concerns are particularly important with respect to the development of alternative financial services in
securities-related areas that may be offered to their business
clients.2 5
2.

The Competitive Position of State Banking Institutions

Although the emphasis of this article is on federally
chartered banking institutions, state banking institutions are
a significant numerical factor in the United States banking
system.2 6 Even certain major commercial banks (e.g., Bankers
21. Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96
Stat. 1469-1548 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); see Norton, supra note 6
at 1627-51.
22. See, e.g., Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 286 F. Supp. 770 (D. Mass. 1968), aff'd,
408 F.2d 1147 (1st Cir. 1969), vacated, 397 U.S. 315 (1970) on remand, 428 F.2d 359
(1st Cir. 1970), rev'd, 400 U.S. 45 (1970), on remand, 338 F. Supp. 721 (D. Mass.
1972), afl'd, 472 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1972); M&M Leasing Corp. v. Seattle First Nat'l
Bank, 391 F. Supp. 1290 (W.D. Wash. 1975), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 563 F.2d
1377 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 453-56.
24. The Glass Steagall Act refers to four key sections (§§ 16, 20, 21 & 32) of the
Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162, now codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24 (Seventh),
377, 378 & 78 and relate to limitations on banking involvement in securities actions.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 453-56.
26. On state banking laws generally, see Banks: Organization and Function,
1 Banking Law chs. 2-5 (MB) (1985 & Supp.).
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Trust and Manufacturers Hanover) remain state chartered institutions. Also, with deregulation many state banking systems have been most aggressive in competing for bank charters and related business. For example, the State of Delaware
recently enacted a banking law that (i) expands bank powers;
(ii) confers extensive credit powers, including the elimination
of maximum usury rates and the retroactive application of
certain changes in a credit account agreement; (iii) reduces
bank taxes and (iv) authorizes out-of-state banking laws to attract domestic and interstate financial interests.2 Other
states, such as Maryland 2 and South Dakota,2 9 also are liberalizing their state banking laws. In certain instances, state
laws (e.g., in a Glass-Steagall context) may permit broader
powers than federal laws and regulations.3 Accordingly, in assessing a banking institution's competitive position and the
applicable statutory and regulatory framework, one must be
aware of the expanding business opportunities of various state
banking institutions.
Traditionally, state banks derive their powers from state
banking laws and state bank charters. Express statutory powers include the power to (i) contract with bank customers, (ii)
borrow money, (iii) act as agents for bank customers, (iv) issue drafts, (v) make loans, (vi) negotiate and endorse note and
bills of exchange, (vii) issue guarantees in limited circumstances, (viii) issue letters of credit, (ix) hold and acquire real
estate in limited circumstances and (x) buy and sell stock in
limited circumstances. In addition, state banks have those
powers that can be fairly implied from their express powers or
are incidental to their express powers.31 Also, many states
have "wildcard" statutes that permit state banks to have owners equivalent to those of a national bank.2
27. See Lubaroff & Ambro, Delaware Financial Center Development Act 99
BANKING L.J. 580 (1982).
28. MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. §§ 1-12 (1986).
29. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 51-15 to 51-28 (1986).
30. For example, non-Federal Reserve System state banks and state S&Ls are
apparently outside the statutory embrace of the Glass-Steagall Act, with any prohibitions in securities related activities resting with applicable state laws and regulations.
31. See generally 1 Banking Law, supra note 26, at § 4.04.
32. Id. at § 4.03[10].
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"Reregulated" Banking Environment
The Statutory Bases for Lending and Investment
Powers

All activities of a banking institution must have express
statutory or regulatory bases or be deemed to be an activity or
power incidental to or implied from an express power. 3
1. National Banks
National banks, the predominant commercial lender
among banking institutions,3 may enter into any type of
lending relationship provided that the relationship does not
exceed lending limits based upon the bank's capital accounts.
These banks derive their lending powers primarily from the
National Banking Act.3 5 The banks are empowered, subject to
applicable lending limits, to discount and to negotiate promissory notes, drafts, bills and exchanges and other evidences of
indebtedness and to lend money on personal security. 6 The
Federal Reserve Act authorizes the Comptroller to set the
conditions and limitations regarding loans secured by real estate,3 7 a subject without the scope of this text. The relevant
Comptroller regulations on lending activities are contained in
3 8
Title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
2.

Savings and Loan Associations

Federally chartered S&Ls derive their lending powers
from the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, as amended
(HOLA).3 9 Historically, these institutions were restricted to
lending funds on the security of their shares or on the security
of first lien mortgages within the limited geographic area of
their home office. 40 Through numerous amendments over the
33. Id. at § 4.01.
34. Bush Report, supra note 19, at 20. In terms of assets, national banks comprise 60% of total bank assets, although numerically accounting for only 33% of the
approximately 14,000 commercial banks in the United States.
35. See National Banks, 2 Banking Law § 28.02 (MB) (1985 & Supp.).
36. Id.; 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh).
37. See 2 Banking Law, supra note 35, at § 28.02.
38. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 1-12, 16-22, 25-35 (1986).
39. Home Owners' Loan Act (HOLA), ch. 64, § 1, 48 Stat. 128-35 (1933) (current
version at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-70 (1984)).
40. Id. at 48 Stat. 132, § 5(c).
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years (particularly Title IV of the 1980 Omnibus Banking Act
and Title III of the 1982 Banking Act), the lending powers of
federal S&Ls have been substantially expanded.4 1 The relevant FHLBB regulations on lending activities of S&Ls are
contained in Title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations.42
With deregulation, the commercial and other lending
powers of S&Ls have significantly expanded. However, in contrast to the lending powers of national banks, the lending activities of federal S&Ls are limited by lending limitations in
several loan categories. To summarize, a federal S&L currently has statutory authority to grant: loans on the security
of its transaction accounts; 4 - loans on the security of liens on
real property (loans secured by nonresidential real property
are subject to a 40% aggregate loan limitation) ;44 loans for
home improvement and loans for manufactured homes;45 certain federally insured loans to finance the purchase of real estate; 4" loans to financial institutions subject to federal examination or supervision or to federally registered brokers or
dealers, secured by loans, obligations or investments that the
S&L has statutory power to invest in directly;4 7 secured
or unsecured consumer loans (subject to a 30% aggregate
limitation); 4 educational loans (subject to a 5% aggregate
limitation);49 nonconforming real estate loans for primarily
residential or farm purposes (subject to a 5% aggregate limitation); 50 loans to business development credit corporations
(limited in the aggregate to the lesser of 1 % of the S&L's assets or $250,000 and subject to other requirements); 5 1 loans
secured by mortgages as to which the S&L has the benefit of
41. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, 94
Stat. 132-93 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); see also text accompanying
note 21.
42. See 12 C.F.R. § 541-556.7 (1986).
43. 12 C.F.R. § 545.52; 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(1)(A) (1982 & Supp. I 1983).
44. 12 C.F.R. §§ 545.32, 545.33, 545.34; 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(1)(B) (1982 & Supp. I
1983). Section 322 of the 1982 Banking Act, deleted all loan-to-value ratios.
45. 12 C.F.R. §§ 545.42, 545.45; 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(1)(J) (1982).
46. 12 C.F.R. § 545.38; 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(1)(K) (1982).
47. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(1)(L) (1982).
48. Id. at § 1464(c)(2)(B); 12 C.F.R. § 545.50.
49. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(3)(A).
50. Id. at § 1464(c)(3)(C).
51. Id. at § 1464(c)(4)(A).
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federal insurance; 52 loans for commercial, corporate, business
or agricultural purposes (subject to a 10% aggregate limitation).5 3 A federal S&L now also is authorized, subject to regu-

lations of the FHLBB, to issue credit
cards and to otherwise
54
engage in credit card operations.
Loans to a single borrower by an S&L are limited to the
amount that a national bank with the same capital and surplus can make. 5 Federal S&Ls have the authority to lease or
sell tangible personal property, including, without limitation,
vehicles, manufactured homes, machinery, equipment and
furniture. 5

However, as will be discussed subsequently, the lending
powers of banking institutions bring new and different risks
and concerns for bank regulators in such areas as classification of loans and determination of adequate loan loss
reserves, 57 capital adequacy, 58 insider" and affiliate"0 transac-

tions and international lending. 61
III. LIMITATIONS ON FUND AVAILABILITY

Limitations on funds available for loans made by banking
institutions may include borrowing limitations, reserve requirements and liquidity requirements. Certain credit allocation, capital adequacy, asset classification and allowance for
loan loss requirements may also affect the availability of
funds for lending purposes and the overall costs of lending.
A. Aggregate Borrowing Limitations
Prior to the enactment of the 1982 Banking Act, the National Bank Act (NBA) set forth an overall limitation on the
amount of indebtedness that a national bank may incur or for
52. Id. at § 1464(c)(4)(C); 12 C.F.R. § 545.38.
53. Section 325 of the 1982 Banking Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(1)(R).

54. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(b)(4) (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 545.51.
55. See infra notes 244-51 and accompanying text.
56. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. 1 1983), as amended by § 330 of the
1982 Banking Act.
57. See infra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 95-150 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 252-303 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 304-40 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 401-26 and accompanying text.
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which it may in any way be liable. The NBA had established
an aggregate limit not to exceed the bank's capital stock, plus
50% of the amount of its unimpaired surplus fund. 2 However, the 1982 Banking Act repealed this aggregate borrowing
limitation.6 3 Yet such borrowings remain subject to the overall
(and often elusive) statutory and regulatory requirement to
maintain "safe and sound" banking practices." Federal S&Ls
are not subject to an aggregate borrowing limitation but are
subject to the extent that they are required to maintain "Aafe
65
and sound" practices.
B. FRB Reserve Requirements
All "depository institutions" are required to maintain legal reserves pursuant to statute and to FRB Regulation D. 66
This revised regulation D resulted from requirements of the
Monetary Control Act of 1980 (Title I of the 1980 Omnibus
Banking Act).6 7 These reserve requirements directly affect an
institution's overall cost of funds and, thus, the ultimate pric6 8
ing of a loan arrangement.
For purposes of regulation D, a depository institution
includes:
any federally insured commercial or savings bank;
any such bank eligible to become insured by the FDIC;
any mutual or stock savings bank;
any S&L that is a member of the FHLBB;
any S&L eligible for FSLIC insurance;
any credit union insured with the National Credit Union
Administration;
any credit union eligible for such insurance;
62. 12 U.S.C. § 82 (repealed).
63. Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-320, §
402, 96 Stat. 1469, 1510 (1982).
64. See, e.g., Groos Nat'l Bank v. Comptroller of the Currency, 573 F.2d 889, 897
(5th Cir. 1978).
65. FHLBB, Borrowing; Limitations and Net Worth Requirements, 47 Fed. Reg.
4,052 (1982) (codified as amended 12 C.F.R. §§ 544.2, 563.8 (1986)).
66. 12 U.S.C. § 461 (1982 & Supp. I 1983); FRB, Regulation D, Reserve Require-

ments of Depository Institutions, 12 C.F.R. § 204 (1986).
67. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132.
68. See, e.g., Gass, Loan Pricing,comprising ch. 5 in NORTON-CLG, supra note 3.
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U.S. branches or agencies of foreign banks with total world
wide assets in excess of $1 billion; and
any "Edge Act" and "Agreement" corporation. 9
Regulation D provides three categories of deposits for
purposes of reserve requirements:
(i) transaction accounts - demand deposits (i.e., deposits
that can be legally withdrawn immediately and without notice), negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts, savings accounts, savings accounts subject to Automatic Transfer Services (ATS), share draft accounts, accounts subject to
preauthorized telephone transfer or withdrawal and all accounts that permit the account holder to make third party
payments using automated teller machines (ATMs) or remote service units (RSUs). Transaction account computations are "net," that 70
is, total of such accounts less certain
permitted deductions;
(ii) nonpersonal time deposits - time deposits or accounts
that are transferable, time deposits or accounts representing
funds deposited to the credit of, and which any beneficial
interest is held by, a depositor that is not a natural person
(whether or not transferable);7 1 and

(iii) Eurodollar liabilities - net borrowings from related
foreign offices, loans to United States residents made by
overseas offices of depository institutions in the United
States, sales of assets by these institutions to their overseas
offices and proceeds of sales to foreign branches of all
assets.

72

Regulation D provides the following reserve requirements
to the above categories of deposits:
(a) transactions accounts - 3% of first $36.7 million or
less; $1,101,000 plus 12% on excess above $36.7 million;
(b) nonpersonal time deposits, having an original maturity
of less than 11/2 years - 3%;
(c) nonpersonal time deposits, having an original maturity
over 11/2 years - 0%; and
69. 12 C.F.R. §§ 204.1(c)(2), (3) and 204.2(m)(1) (1986).
70. Id. at § 2 04.2(e). Transaction account computations are "net," that is, total
of such accounts less certain permitted deductions. See id. at § 204.20).
71. Id. at § 204.2(f). Commercial paper and due bills may be reservable deposits
in certain circumstances. See id. at § 204.2(a)(1).
72. Id. at § 204.2(h).
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73

reservable liabilities, including deposits, up to $2,870,000
held by any depository institution are not subject to reserve
requirements. 74 Regulation D reserve requirements may be
satisfied by vault cash (except gold or silver) and balances
held directly or on a pass-through basis with a Federal Re7 5
serve District Bank.
Commencing February 2, 1984, reserve computations (for
depository institutions with total deposits of $15 million or
more, edge corporations and United States branches and
agencies of foreign banks) are to be made on the basis of a
contemporaneous accounting system. This system, which may
result in significant new costs to depository institutions, requires such institutions to maintain prescribed reserves on a
daily average basis for a 14-day maintenance period and to
make reserve adjustments within two days of the prescribed
computation date, rather than the old system of permitting a
76
two-week lag.
Effective November 4, 1982, the FHLBB amended
its reserve requirements for FSLIC insured institutions to include
(for statutory reserve, as well as for net worth tests) a new
item called "appraised equity capital." This term is essentially
the mathematical difference between the net book value and
the appraised market value of office, land, building and improvements (including leasehold improvements) owned by the
insured institution or any of its subsidiaries or, in some instances, the deferred profit from a sale with leaseback of formerly owned office property." FHLBB examiners have been
advised that, effective March 31, 1983, S&L reserve requirements on nonpersonal time deposits were modified to conform
to FRB regulation D requirements.7 8 Reserve reporting requirements by depository institutions vary according to levels
73. Id. at § 204.9(a), as amended by FRS, Reserve Requirements of Depository
Institutions; Reserve Requirement Ratios, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,175 (1986).
74. See § 411 of the 1982 Banking Act, modified by 12 C.F.R. § 204.9(a)(2).
75. 12 C.F.R. § 204.3(b).
76. Id. at § 204.3.
77. See FHLBB, Reserve Requirement for FSLIC Insured Institutions, 47 Fed.
Reg. 52,961 (1983).
78. See FHLBB Memo. T67-4, 1 Fed. Guide (U.S. League of Say. Inst.) T 10,373
(1984).
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of reservable liabilities and deposits. It is clear that state
chartered non FRS member banks are subject to FRB reserve
79
requirements.
C.

Liquidity Requirements

Regulatory concern for bank liquidity is primarily addressed through the bank examination process.80
D.

Credit Allocation and the Community Reinvestment
Act (CRA)

The legislative history of the CRA 8 ' demonstrates that
this legislation was directed against the practice of "redlining," that is, the use of funds deposited by residents in neighborhood institutions for purposes that would not benefit the
depositors or the neighborhoods. In effect, this legislation directs itself to credit allocation, which in turn may impact on
the availability of funds for lending purposes. 2
The primary purpose of the CRA is to encourage financial
institutions to meet the credit needs of the local communities
they serve, consistent with the safe and sound operation of
the institution. This purpose is achieved through examination
of these institutions by the appropriate federal financial supervisory agency. 3
The CRA applies to all "regulated financial institutions"
(i.e., an institution whose deposits are insured by the FDIC or
FSLIC). 4 The CRA does not establish specific requirements
for bank performance but seeks to use the bank's examination
process as a device for fostering acceptable "standards" of
performance. The standard for assessing the performance of
79. First Bank & Trust Co. v. FRB, 605 F. Supp. 555 (E.D. Ky. 1984).
80. See, e.g., infra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
81. Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, § 802, 91 Stat.
1147; 12 U.S.C. § 2901-2905 (1982); see generally, Consumer Credit, 8 BANKING LAW
ch. 158 (MB).(1985 & Supp.). See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. 1202 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1979).
82. See generally, Hearings on S. 406 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977). See also, Duncan, Hood &
Neet, Redlining Practices, Racial Resegregation, and Urban Decay: Neighborhood
Housing Services as a Viable Alternative, 7 URBAN LAW 510 (1975); Note, The Legality of Redlining Under the Civil Rights Laws, 25 AM. UNIv. L. REv. 463 (1977).
83. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b).
84. Id. at § 2902(2).
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each financial institution is subjective and is whether each institution serves the convenience and needs of the community
in which it is chartered to do business.25
The CRA does not establish a new framework for bank
regulation or examination but is superimposed upon, and accordingly is limited by, the existing federal regulatory structures. Thus, the regulatory authorities that implement the
CRA are as follows: (i) the Comptroller supervises national
bank; (ii) the FRB supervises state-chartered banks that are
members of the FRS and supervises bank holding companies;
(iii) the FDIC supervises state-chartered banks and savings
banks that are not members of the FRS, the deposits of which
are insured by the FDIC; and (iv) the FHLBB supervises institutions with deposits insured by the FSLIC and supervises
S&L holding companies.86
The purpose of the CRA examination is two-fold: the
continuing assessment and monitoring of a banking institution's record of meeting the credit needs of its entire community, including low and moderate income neighborhoods, consistent with the "safe and sound" operations of such
institution; and the consideration of such record of perform7
ance when evaluating an "application" by such institution.
The term "application for a deposit facility" by a national
bank, would include, for example, an application for a charter
for a national bank, deposit insurance in connection with a
newly chartered institution, the establishment of a domestic
branch, the relocation of a home or branch office and mergers
or acquisitions. 8
The CRA provides that the appropriate federal financial
supervisory agency has a duty to carry out the purposes of the
85. Id. at §§ 2901(a), (b) & 2903.
86. Id. at § 2901(a).
87. See id. at § 2901(b); see also Givens, The "Antiredlining" Issue: Can Banks
be Forced to Lend?, 95 BANKING L.J. 515 (1978); Healey, A Banker's Guide to the
Community Reinvestment Act, 96 BANKING L.J. 705 (1979); The Community Reinvestment Act Regulations: Another Attempt to Control Redlining, 28 CATH. UNIV. L.
REv. 635 (1979).
88. 12 U.S.C. § 2902(3).
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CRA. The respective federal regulations are substantively parallel to each other.89 These regulations are illustrated by-the
requirement of the Comptroller that a national bank:
prepare and annually review a delineation of the loan community or communities that comprise the entire lending territory of a bank (as portrayed on a map or maps), without
excluding low and moderate income neighborhoods. A national bank is permitted to use its "effective lending territory," defined as that area or areas around each office or
group of offices where it makes "a substantial portion of its
loans," and all areas equally distant from its offices as those
areas. The reasonableness of this delineation will be reviewed by the national bank examiners;
adopt a Community Reinvestment Act Statement (CRA
Statement) for each delineated community;
post in the public lobby at each of its offices (other than offpremise electronic deposit facilities) a public notice (CRA
Notice) in the form prescribed by the CRA.90
These are the only express requirements of specific action to
be taken by a national bank or a federal S&L.9 '
A national bank is required to maintain records for public
inspection, consisting of written comments received from the
public within the past two years that are specifically related to
any CRA Statement or to the bank's performance, any responses to the comments that the bank wishes to make and
any CRA Statements in effect during the past two years.9 2
The CRA Statement must be reviewed annually by the bank's
93
board of directors.
The various CRA regulations do not provide specific
guidelines for assessing the performance of banking institutions. Performance is assessed within the context of (i) serving
the "convenience and needs" of the communities being served
89. Id. at § 2905. Cf. FRB Regulation BB, 12 C.F.R. § 228 (1986); Comptroller's
Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 25 (1986); FDIC Community
Reinvestment Act Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 345 (1986); and FHLBB Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 12 C.F.R. pt. 563(e) (1986).
90. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 25.3, .4 & .6.
91. See, e.g., Golden, How to Draft Your Community Reinvestment Act Statement, 97 BANKING L.J. 46 (1980).
92. 12 U.S.C. § 25.4(e).
93. Id. at § 25.4(d).
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(which is to include the needs for credit services as well as
deposit services), consistent with (ii) the "safe and sound"
94
operations of the banking institution.
While the CRA is not of direct concern in a commercial
lending transaction, this legislation should be of direct concern to management of a banking institution in determining
the institution's overall lending policies and in dealing with
the regulators in the examination and application processes.
Moreover, CRA compliance serves as a very real lever for the
regulators in their institutional examinations and in the application processes, a reality that has become more apparent in
recent regulatory informal practices.
E.

Capital Adequacy Requirements

In November 1983, Congress enacted the International
Lending Supervisory Act of 1983,11 which directed the federal
banking agencies, that is, the Comptroller, the FRB and the
FDIC to achieve and maintain adequate levels of capital by
establishing minimum levels of capital for banking institutions. Prior to the enactment of this statute, the agencies had
adopted capitalization policies under the authority of their
regulatory powers; 96 however, the enforceability of such policies had been challenged.9 7 As discussed below, the banking
agencies promulgated uniform minimum capital levels for all
federally supervised banking organizations, including FDIC
insured banks,9 8 national banks,9 9 Federal Reserve Board
member banks' 0 0 and bank holding companies.01° While these
94. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 25.7; see also, Dennis, The Community Reinvestment
Act of 1977: Defining "Convenience and Needs of the Community," 95 BANKING L.J.
693 (1978).
95. Pub. L. No. 98-181, 97 Stat. 1153 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3912 (Supp.
II 1984)).
96. FRB and OCC, Joint Statement on Capital Adequacy, FDIC, 46 Fed. Reg.
62,694 (1981); FRB Issues Policy Statement of Member Bank/ BHC Payment of
Cash Dividends, [Current] Fed. Banking Law L. Rep. (CCH)
86,460 (Nov. 14,
1985).
97. First Nat'l Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d 678
(5th Cir. 1983).
98. See infra notes 106-13 and accompanying text.
99. See infra notes 114-23 and accompanying text.
100. See infra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
101. Id.
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capital adequacy requirements do not directly increase the
cost of funds, 102 they do increase the overall costs for an institution to conduct business and do limit fund availability. In
fact, if the new risk-based capital proposals are enacted
(which appears most likely), they may specifically affect lend03
ing practices and costs.'
The regulations set forth the minimum acceptance ratio
of total capital to adjusted total assets at 6% and the minimum ratio of primary capital to adjusted total assets at 51/2 %.
The regulations increased the minimum primary and total
capital levels for larger regional and multinational banking institutions and eliminated the disparate minimum capital
levels for large and small banking institutions. In summary,
the uniform ratios now apply to banking institutions of all
04
sizes.1
Notwithstanding these overall, more stringent capital adequacy requirements, the FRB, FDIC and Comptroller have
recently issued policy statements that would permit otherwise
healthy banks with loans concentrated in the energy and agricultural areas to operate under more lenient capital adequacy
rules and rules for accounting for restructured loans. 0 5
102. See NORTON-CLG supra note 3, ch. 5.
103. See infra notes 142-50 and accompanying text.
104. Cf. Regulators Should Require Higher Quality Capital, Analyst Suggests,
46 Wash. Fin. Rep. No. 8, at 302-03 (Feb. 24, 1986).
105. In the spring of 1986 the federal banking agencies adopted a capital forbearance plan for agriculture and energy banks. Qualified banks, banks with 25% of their
loans in agricultural or oil and gas loans, may be permitted to maintain their capital
at 4% rather than the previously required 6%. The other condition for qualification
for capital forbearance is that the compromised condition of a bank must be the result of difficulties in the agriculture or energy business and not bank mismanagement.
Qualified banks submit an application to the appropriate federal banking agency.
The application includes: (i) proof of eligibility and (ii) a business plan that addresses: (a) dividend levels, (b) compensation plans, (c) payments for goods and services to bank affiliates and (d) restored capital by January 1, 1993. Periodic reports
on the capital forbearance plan will be required by the granting agency.
The capital forbearance program may impact differently on banks. For example,
the lending limit in state banks may decrease under a forbearance plan. In contrast,
the lending limit regulation for qualified national banks has been temporarily
amended. The amendment substitutes an increased general lending limit to 20% of
total capital. The new limit does not increase a bank's lending limit above what it
would have been if the bank had not experienced agriculture and energy losses. The
temporary amendment expires on January 1, 1993. OCC, National Bank's Lending
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1. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Under this regulation all FDIC insured state banks must
maintain a ratio of total capital to total assets of at least 6%
and a ratio of primary capital to total assets of at least
51/2 %.10 If a bank is not deemed to be fundamentally sound
and well-managed, then higher ratios may be required.10 7 Primary capital is defined to include:
Common stock, perpetual preferred stock, capital surplus

. . .

undivided profits, capital reserves, mandatory con-

vertible debt (to the extent of 20 percent of primary capital
exclusive of such debt), minority interests in consolidated
subsidiaries, net worth certificates ...

and the allowance for

loan and lease losses and minus intangible assets other than
morgage [sic] servicing rights and assets classified loss. °s
Secondary capital includes mandatory convertible debt not included in primary capital, limited life preferred stock and
subordinated notes and debentures, up to 50% of primary
capital." 9 The sum of primary and secondary capital is total
capital." 0
Banks that do not comply with the requirements are subject to several sanctions. Applications will not be approved
unless the bank is under an acceptable plan to increase its
capital."" A bank with less than the required capital is
deemed to be engaging in an unsafe or unsound practice,
Limits; Request for Comment, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,303 (1986) and OCC, National Bank's
Lending Limit; Request for Comment, 51 Fed. Reg. 19,164 (1986).
Also the FDIC's program extends to banks with primary capital ratio at 3%, if
the ratio could be projected to reach 4% within one year. Neither the Comptroller
nor the FRB established such a floor. FDIC Adopts Capital Forbearance Policy Toward Energy and Agricultural Lenders, [Current] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 11
86,543 (March 27, 1986) (FDIC), OCC, Adopts Capital Forbearance Policy Toward
Agricultural and Energy Lenders, [Current] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
86,546
(Comptroller), and FRB Adopts Capital Forbearance Policy Toward Energy and Agricultural Lenders, [Current] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 86, 559 (March 28, 1986)
(FRB).
106. Capital Maintenance, FDIC, 50 Fed. Reg. 11,128 (1985) (codified at 12
C.F.R. § 325.3(b)).
107. 12 C.F.R. § 325.3(a) (1986).
108. Id. at § 325.2(h).
109. Id. at § 325.2(i).
110. Id.
111. Id. at § 325.3(c)(2), (3), (d)(2).

1986]

"Reregulated" Banking Environment

unless it is complying with an acceptable plan to increase its
capital, and such banks are subject to the issuance of
directives.' 1 2 A bank with less than a 3% primary capital ratio
is deemed to be operating in an unsafe and unsound condition, unless it is complying with an agreed-upon plan to increase its capital. A bank with a ratio equal to or greater than
3% may be operating in an unsafe or unsound condition.1 13
2.

Comptroller of the Currency

The minimum capital ratios are 6% for total capital and
51/2% for primary capital for well-managed banks. 14' The
Comptroller defines primary capital to include:
Common stock, perpetual preferred stock, capital surplus, undivided profits, reserves for contingencies and other
capital reserves (excluding accrued dividends on perpetual
and limited life preferred stock), net worth certificates ... ,
minority interests in consolidated subsidiaries, and allowances for loan and lease losses; minus intangible assets;
• . . [plus] [p]urchased mortgage servicing rights; and ...
[m]andatory convertible debt to the extent of 20% of the
sum of [the above].' 1 8
Secondary capital is defined to include mandatory convertible
debt not included in primary capital and limited life preferred
stock and subordinated notes and debentures, to the extent
that the total does not exceed 50% of primary capital. 6 Total capital is the sum of primary capital and secondary capital. 117 The regulation provides some flexibility in defining primary and secondary capital, however, by allowing the
Comptroller to permit other items, in certain circumstances,
112. Id. at §§ 325.4(b), .6(b). Civil money penalties may be assessed for failure to
maintain capital ratios by the FDIC's Board of Review. FDIC Applications, Requests
Submittals, Delegations of Authority, and Notices of Acquisition of Control; Rules of
Practice and Procedures, 50 Fed. Reg. 11,653 (1985).
113. 12 C.F.R. § 325.4(c).
114. Dept. of Treasury Minimum Capital Ratios; Issuance of Directives, 50 Fed.
Reg. 10,207 (1985) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 3.6 (1986)).
115. 12 C.F.R. § 3.2(c) (1986).
116. Id. at § 3.2(d).
117. Id. at § 3.2(e).
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to constitute the defined amount."" The Comptroller has
reserved the ability to authorize either less than or more
than the minimum capital, depending on particular banks'
circumstances.'
The regulation sets out in detail when
higher ratios may be necessary 2 ° and the procedures for establishing a minimum capital ratio.' The regulation provides
sanctions for noncomplying banks, including the issuance of a
directive, assessment of penalties and denial or revocation of
applications. 2 2 The Comptroller prohibits banks from selling
loans with recourse to reduce assets and thereby reduce capital requirements.' 2 3
3.

Federal Reserve Board

The FRB's minimum capital ratios for FRS member state
banks and bank holding companies are the same as those of
the other agencies, with a 6% total ratio and a 51/2 % primary
ratio.' 2 " The FRB, however, continues to view the total capital
ratio in terms of three zones - total capital under 6%, between 6% and 7% and over 7% .125 The amount of the Board's
supervisory action is dependent on the zone in which the bank
falls and its compliance with the minimum primary capital ratio. Primary capital includes (subject to certain limitations)
common stock, perpetual preferred stock, perpetual debt surplus, undivided profits, contingency and other capital
reserves, mandatory convertible instruments, allowances for
possible loan and lease losses and minority interests in equity
118. Id. at § 3.4.
119. Id. at §§ 3.8 3.9-.12.
120. Id. at § 3.10.
121. Id. at § 3.11-.12.
122. Id. at § 3.14.
123. See OCC's Clarke Labels Authorization of Bank Securities Powers Number
One Priority to Ensure Health of Banking Industry, 43 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) No.
23 at 989, 993 (June 9, 1986).
124. 12 C.F.R. § 208.13 for FRB member state banks, which refers to 12 C.F.R. §
225 App. A as set forth in Federal Reserve System, Membership of State Banking
Institutions; Bank Holding Company and Change in Bank Control; Capital Maintenance; Rules of Procedure, 50 Fed. Reg. 16,057 (1985).
125. 50 Fed. Reg. 16,057, 16,066 (1985) (as modified by FRS, Capital Guidelines;
Perpetual Debt as Primary Capital and Limits on Perpetual Debt, Preferred Stock
and Mandatory Convertible Securities, 51 Fed. Reg. 40,963 (1986)).
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accounts of consolidated subsidiaries; intangible assets are deducted from the total of these components.12 6 Secondary capital includes limited life preferred stock and qualifying subordinated notes and debentures (up to 50% of primary
capital) .127
As between banks and bank holding companies, the FRB
distinguishes its treatment of intangible assets. Banks deduct
goodwill in computing the capital ratios and include other intangibles in the capital computations. Bank holding companies are not required to automatically deduct goodwill. Similarly, equity commitment notes (a subordinated debt
instrument converted into common stock or perpetual preferred stock) are not treated as capital for banks but are
128
treated as capital for bank holding companies.
The FRB may require particular banks or bank holding
companies to maintain a higher than the minimum level of
capital. The FRB also sets out detailed procedures of issuing
129
and enforcing directives.

4.

Differences Among the Agency Rules and Regulations

Both the FDIC's and the Comptroller's capital adequacy
standards were codified into a regulation, whereas the FRB's
standards remain as a policy statement. The FRB noted that
its decision to issue only a policy statement stems from the
"need for flexibility in applying minimum capital ratios and
even in defining 'capital.' ,,130 Another difference in the standards is the time requirements set out for banks to respond to
directives. The FDIC allows a bank fourteen days to respond,131 the Comptroller allows thirty days 12 and the FRB
does not set any time limit for responding to the Board but
will set the limits in each individual case. A third difference
among the agencies is the zone concept the FRB uses in addition to the minimum capital levels.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 16,067.
Id.
Id. at 16,068.
Id. 16,069-70.
Federal Reserve System, Capital Maintenance, 49 Fed. Reg. 30,317 (1984).
12 C.F.R. § 325.6(b)(2).
Id. at § 3.17 (1986).
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The agencies generally, however, will use the same capital
definitions and have the same ratios. All three agencies also
treat all banking organizations in the same manner, regardless
of size. The new standards should, therefore, provide a great
deal of uniformity in the regulation of capital adequacy of
banking institutions.
5.

Federal Home Loan Bank Board Net Worth
Requirements

The FHLBB as trustee for the FSLIC has the authority
to require capital for insured institutions.' 3 Under this authority the FHLBB promulgated regulatory capital rules that
increase the capital requirement from 3% of liabilities to 6%
according to industry profitability over the next six to twelve
years. 134
The annual capital requirements will be determined by a
percentage of the industry's return of assets during the preceding year. Beginning in April 1987, the FHLBB will calculate the 1986 return on assets. For institutions with 3% or
more in regulatory capital, the capital level will increase by
75% of the 1986 return on assets. For institutions with less
than 3% in regulatory capital, the capital level will increase
by 90% of the 1986 return on assets. Many de novo institutions have been required to maintain capital levels that are
higher than other institutions; de novo institutions will be required to maintain the higher of their de novo standard or 6%
of liabilities. Special rules apply to growth through mergers or
acquisitions. Institutions are required to calculate and meet
133. 12 U.S.C. § 1726(b). Savings and Loan associations may now include in their
net worth nonpermanent preferred stock which is redeemable at the option of the
issuer. The associations may also include in their net worth redeemable preferred
stock with mandatory redemption. FHLBB, Preferred Stock as Regulatory Net
Worth, 50 Fed. Reg. 46,739 (1985).
134. Under the new regulation, effective January 1, 1987, capital is called "regulatory capital." Under the former regulation the term was "regulatory net worth." 12
C.F.R. § 563.13 as set forth in FHLBB, Regulatory Capital (Net Worth) Requirements of Insured Institutions, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,565 (1986).
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their regulatory capital requirements each quarter beginning
with the first quarter of 1987."'
Higher regulatory capital ratios are required of institutions that have direct investments, land loans, construction
loans and letters of credit. Institutions are divided into three
categories to determine the contingency components: (i) Institutions that do not meet the 3% capital requirements; (ii) institutions that meet current requirements but have capital
less than 6% of their phased-in requirement level; and (iii)
institutions that are capitalized at the phased-in level or 6%.
The capital reserves for direct investments and loans are
as follows:

Land Loans &
Nonresidential
Construction Loans137
-10%
of investments -4%
of loans
-5%
of investments -2% of loans up to
up to 10% of assets
10% of assets
-10% of additional -4% of loans over 10%
investments
of assets
-No reserve up to
-No reserve up to and
10% of assets
including 10% of assets

Category of Direct
36
Institution Investments

(i)
(ii)

(iii)

-5%
for second 10% -2%
for more than
of assets
10% and less than 20%
of assets
-10% for additional -4% for more than
investments
20% of assets
A 2 % capital reserve is required for all institutions that issue
standby letters of credit. 3 8
135. 12 C.F.R. § 563.13(b)(8) & (9), 12 C.F.R. § 563.13(c)(2), 12 C.F.R. §
563.13(c)(3), and 12 C.F.R. § 563.13(c)(1). The Principal Supervisory Agent had delegated authority to convert the net worth calculation to the standard net worth computation. The FHLBB has terminated that delegated authority and the Board will
now directly supervise that conversion. FHLBB, Net-Worth Requirements of Insured
Institutions, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,876 (1986).
136. 12 C.F.R. § 563.13(b)(10)(iii)(A).
137. Id. at § 563.13(b)(10)(iv)(A) and (b)(10)(v)(A).
138. Id. at 12 C.F.R. § 563.13(b)(10)(vi).
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The Capital rules also clarify the liability growth rules.
Unless an institution has capital equal to the higher of 6% of
liabilities or its phased-in capital requirement, liability growth
is limited to a growth rate of 12.5% within two quarter periods. Prior regulatory approval is required to exceed the
growth rates. 13 9
Federal savings and loan associations are authorized to issue notes, bonds, debentures or other securities (including
capital stock)."" Wholly-owned finance subsidiaries of federal
S&L's as an incidental power to the parent's authority may
also issue securities. The FHLBB has modified its rules relating to the issuance of securities by finance subsidiaries.
The creation of a finance subsidiary must be expressly
authorized by the board of directors of the parent S&L by
means of a business plan. The S&L may capitalize the subsidiary without FHLBB approval by transferring assets that (i)
do not exceed 30% of the S&L's assets; and (ii) do not have a
market value exceeding the lesser of (a) the amount necessary
and customary to a particular type of securities issuance, or
(b) 250% of the issuance. The securities may be sold by third
parties. This rule permits small S&Ls to have better access to
capital markets.
An S&L may guarantee the unpaid balance of the subsidiary's obligation; however, the subsidiary's assets must be exhausted prior to recourse to the guarantee. A finance subsidiary is prohibited from (i) dealing in the accounts of the parent
S&L; (ii) stating that its securities are insured by the FSLIC
or (iii) issuing securities that accelerate upon the parent
S&L's insolvency. The finance subsidiary is not consolidated
with the parent S&L for the calculation of the S&L's net
worth. The FHLBB receives notice of creation of the subsidiary, transfer of assets to the subsidiary, and issuance of
securities.""
139. Id. at § 564.13-1.
140. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(b)(2).
141. FHLBB, Classification of Assets, 50 Fed. Reg. 53,275 (1985).
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6.

Risk-Based Capital Proposals

The FRB, FDIC and Comptroller have each recently published for comment proposed "risk-based capital" plans. The
FRB's and FDIC's joint proposal would supplement their existing capital adequacy regulations.'4 2 The Comptroller's proposal would replace, in its entirety, the existing capital adequacy regulation. 43 However, these regulators still have as an
objective the issuance of final joint risk-based capital rules.
The Comptroller's proposed regulation basically parallels
that of the FRB and FDIC by factoring into capital requirements the riskiness of bank assets into capital calculations
and by requiring banks to hold capital against certain off-balance sheet items such as standby letters of credit, binding
loan commitments, interest rate swaps and foreign exchange
risks. 144 This latter treatment of such off-balance sheet items
may have the effect of increasing institutional costs of certain
commercial lending activities. 145
Four categories of bank assets and certain off-balance
sheet items would be established, with relative weights being
assigned to each category:146 cash and cash equivalents (0%),
money market risk (30%), moderate risk category (60%), and
standard risk category (100%). The dollar value of items in
each category would be multiplied by the category's risk
weight in order to determine the measure of risk-weighted as47
sets for a particular bank."
Under the Comptroller's plan, it would be possible for
certain banks to operate below the present minimum 51/2 %
primary capital ratio."4 The Comptroller is, however, considering whether certain "classified" assets should be deducted
from a bank's primary capital and whether loan reserves
142. See, e.g., FDIC Capital Maintenance; Supplemental Adjusted Capital Proposal, 51 Fed. Reg. 6,126 (1986).
143. See FDIC, Minimum Capital Ratios; Risk-Based Capital Standard for National Banks, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,602 (1986).
144. Id. at 10,606.
145. See Stockwell, The Loan Commitment, in NORTON-CLG, supra note 3, at
ch. 6.
146. 51 Fed. Reg. 10,602, 10,603.
147. Id. at 10,604-05, table 2, for illustration.
148. Id. at 10,602.
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should be excluded from such capital.14 9 The FHLBB's50recent
net worth rules also factor in a "risk-based" concept.1
F.

Asset Classification and Allowances for Losses

The various bank regulators employ loan classification in
their examination procedures. For example, the Comptroller,
FDIC, FRB and the Conference of State Bank Examiners
have adopted "Uniform Guidelines" for the classification of
loans. These classifications are:
Substandard asset, which includes a loan inadequately protected by the current sound worth and paying capacity of
the obligor or of the collateral pledged, if any. These assets
have well-defined weaknesses that jeopardize the liquidation
of the debt and are characterized by the distinct possibility
that the bank will sustain some loss if the deficiencies are
not corrected.
Doubtful asset, which includes a loan that has all the weaknesses inherent in one classified as "substandard," with the
added characteristic that the weaknesses make collection or
liquidation in full highly questionable and improbable. Fifty
percent of the total of "doubtful" loans are deducted in
computing a bank's required capital.
Loss asset, which includes a loan considered uncollectible
and of such little value that its continuance as a bankable
asset is not warranted. A loss loan may have some salvageable value; however, a determination is made that it is not
practical or desirable to defer writing off this basically
worthless asset even though partial recovery may be effected
in the future. All of the "loss" is to be deducted in computing a bank's required capital."'
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board has adopted similar
loan evaluation rules. Loans classified as "loss" cause the S&L
to reserve 100% of the loan, loans classified as "doubtful"
cause the S&L to reserve 50% of the loan and loans classified
as "substandard" (i.e., a "scheduled" item) cause the S&L to
149. Id. at 10,605-06.
150. See supra notes 133-41.
151. See Federal Reserve Reg. Serv., Locator No. 3-1501 (May 7, 1979), and
Classification of Bank Assets and Appraisal of Securities in Bank Examinations, 5
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 59,201A (May 7, 1979).
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increase its net worth by an amount equal to 20% of the asset's value. The absence of an appraisal or an inadequate appraisal may cause loans otherwise not classifiable for credit
reasons to be classified. Certain S&L assets are not evaluated
by these standards: consumer loans, loans secured by one-tofour family owner occupied homes and nonreal estate
15
securities. 1
Related to the classification of assets is the responsibility
of management of banking institutions to maintain an adequate allowance for loan losses and lease losses (ALLL) and to
establish and follow a system of written procedures to ensure
complete analysis of all factors pertinent to the evaluation of
the ALLL.' 53 Failure to do so could result in an institution's
filing a false or misleading regulatory report (i.e., a "call report") or financial statement, 154 which could lead to regulatory action (including a cease and desist order, civil money
penalties, or a suspension or removal order) 155 or, 156in certain
instances could result in a securities law violation.
G.

Institutional Ratings (CAMEL and BOPEC)

An essential part to a banking institution's regulatory rating is the quality of its loan and investment portfolio. This
rating can well determine the extent and nature of the examination process and supervisory and remedial actions taken by
the relevant regulator. As such, a bank's rating can affect its
future ability (in terms of "safety and soundness" criteria) to
engage in certain types and/or certain amounts of lending
activities.
In 1978, the FRB, FDIC and Comptroller agreed on
Guidelines on a Uniform Interagency Bank Rating System
(CAMEL), which is generally followed by most state bank regulators. CAMEL has two basic aspects: (i) an assessment by
bank examiners of five key factors of a bank's operations and
152.
153.
1985).
154.
155.
156.
1984).

FHLBB, Classification of Assets, 50 Fed. Reg. 53,275 (1986).
See, e.g., Comptroller of the Currency, Banking Circular No. 201 (May 31,
See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 161 (1982).
See, e.g., id. at §§ 1818(b) & (c) (1982 & Supp. 1 1983).
See, e.g., In re Utica Bankshares Corp., SEC Release No. 20,702 (Feb. 29,
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conditions; capital adequacy ("C"), asset quality ("A"), management ("M"), earnings ("E") and liquidity ("L") (ii) an
evaluation of these factors to arrive at a composite, overall
rating of the bank's condition and soundness into one of five
categories.
Each of the five key factors is to be rated on a onethrough-five basis:
Rating No. 1 - indicates strong performance. It is the
highest rating and is indicative of performance significantly
higher than average.
Rating No. 2 - reflects satisfactory performance. It reflects performance that is average or above average; it includes performance that adequately provides for the safe
and sound operation of the bank.
Rating No. 3 - represents performance flawed to some
degree; as such, is considered fair. It is neither satisfactory
nor marginal but is characterized by performance of below
average quality.
Rating No. 4 - represents marginal performance significantly below average; if left unchecked, such performance
might evolve into weaknesses or conditions that could
threaten the viability of the institution.
Rating No. 5 - is considered unsatisfactory. It is the
lowest rating and is indicative of performance critically deficient and in need of immediate remedial attention. Such
performance by itself, or in combination with other 157
weaknesses, could threaten the viability of the institution.
In terms of the composite bank rating, a one-through-five
system is also used:
Composite 1. Banks in this group are sound institutions
in almost every respect; any critical findings are basically of
a minor nature and can be handled in a routine manner.
Such banks are resistant to external economic and financial
disturbances and capable of withstanding the vagaries of
business conditions more ably than banks with lower composite ratings.
Composite 2. Banks in this group are also fundamentally sound institutions but may reflect modest weaknesses
157. See Uniform Interagency Bank Soundness Rating System, [Current] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 97,451 (May 11, 1978).
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correctable in the normal course of business. Such banks are
stable and also able to withstand business fluctuations quite
well; however, areas of weakness could develop into conditions of greater concern. To the extent that the minor adjustments are handled in the normal course of business, the
supervisory response is limited.
Composite 3. Banks in this group exhibit a combination
of weaknesses ranging from moderately severe to unsatisfactory. Such banks are only nominally resistant to the onset of
adverse business conditions and could easily deteriorate if
concerted action is not effective in correcting the areas of
weakness. Consequently, such banks are vulnerable and require more than normal supervision. Overall strength and financial capacity, however, are still such as to make failure
only a remote possibility.
Composite 4. Banks in this group have an immoderate
volume of asset weaknesses or a combination of other conditions that are less than satisfactory. Unless prompt action is
taken to correct these conditions, they could reasonably develop into a situation that could impair future viability. A
potential for failure is present but is not pronounced. Banks
in this category require close supervisory attention and financial surveillance.
Composite 5. This category is reserved for banks whose
conditions are worse than defined under No. 4 above. The
volume and character of weaknesses are such as to require
urgent aid from the shareholders or other sources. Such
banks require immediate corrective action and constant supervisory attention. The probability of failure is high for
158
these banks.

The FRB also emphasizes a component and composite
one-through-five rating system for bank holding company
units (BOPEC).159 In arriving at an overall assessment of fi-

nancial condition, the FRB evaluates the following elements
on a scale of one through five, in descending order of performance quality: (i) bank subsidiaries ("B"); (ii) other (non bank)
subsidiaries ("0"); (iii) parent company ("P"); (iv) earnings,
158. Id.
159. See FRB, Rating Systems Reg. Serv., vol. 1, at 4-865.

Bank Holding Companies, Federal Reserve
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consolidated ("E") and (v) capital adequacy, consolidated
The five composite rating categories are:
Composite 1. Bank holding companies in this group are
sound in almost every respect; any negative findings are basically of a minor nature and can be handled in a routine manner. Such holding companies and their subsidiaries are resistant to external economic and financial disturbances and
readily generate cash flow more than adequate to service their
debt and other fixed obligations with no harm to subsidiaries.
Composite 2. Bank holding companies in this group are
also fundamentally sound but may reflect modest weaknesses
correctable in the normal course of business. Such holding
companies and their subsidiaries generate cash flow adequate
to service their obligations; however, areas of weakness could
develop into conditions of greater concern. To the extent that
the minor adjustments are handled in the normal course of
business, the supervisory response is limited.
Composite 3. Bank holding companies in this group exhibit a combination of weaknesses ranging from fair to moderately severe. Such holding companies and their subsidiaries
are less resistant to the onset of adverse business conditions
and could likely deteriorate if concerted action is not effective
in correcting the areas of weakness. The company's cash flow
is sufficient to meet immediate obligations but, unless action
is taken to correct weaknesses, parent cash flow needs could
adversely affect the financial condition of the subsidiaries.
Consequently, such bank holding companies are vulnerable
and require more than normal supervision. Overall strength
and financial capacity, however, still pose only a remote threat
to the viability of the company.
Composite 4. Bank holding companies and their subsidiaries in this group have an immoderate volume of asset weaknesses or a combination of other conditions that are less than
satisfactory. An additional weakness may be that the holding
company's cash flow needs are met only by upstreaming imprudent dividends and/or fees from its subsidiaries. Unless
prompt action is taken to correct these conditions, they could
160. Id.
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impair future viability. Bank holding companies in this category require close supervisory attention and increased financial surveillance.
Composite 5. The volume and character of the weaknesses of bank holding companies in this category are so critical as to require urgent aid from shareholders or other sources
to prevent insolvency. The imminent inability of such companies to service their fixed obligations and/or to prevent capital
depletion from severe operating losses places their viability
seriously in doubt. Such companies require immediate corrective action and constant supervisory attention.16'
H.

Proposed Federal Home Loan Bank Board Geographic
Restrictions

On April 24, 1986, the FHLBB, in an effort to minimize
risks within the thrift industry, issued a controversial proposal that would restrict nationwide lending and loan participations by federally regulated thrift institutions. 6 2 Effectively
such institutions would be prohibited from purchasing whole
nationwide loans outside their normal lending territories from
sellers with deficient capital or portfolio performance. Thrifts
with capital or portfolio weakness would be permitted to engage in nationwide lending only in conjunction with business
plans approved by a principal supervisory agent.'6 3 If finally
enacted this proposal would be a form of regulatory control,
on a geographic basis over a thrift's lending activities.
IV.

SINGLE BORROWER LENDING LIMITS

Banking institutions are often subject to statutes restricting loan amounts to a single borrower.
161. Id.
162. FHLBB Nationwide Lending Loan Participations, and Loan recordkeeping
Requirements, 51 Fed. Reg. 17,634 (1986).
163. For discussion of proposal, see Bank Board Revises Controversial Nationwide Lending Proposal, 46 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 838 (May 19, 1986)
(subsequent to the preparation of this article the FHLBB has withdrawn this
proposal).
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National Banks

The National Bank Act contains a specific limitation,
under 12 U.S.C. § 84, on the amount of money that may be
loaned to a single borrower. This limitation is commonly referred to as the "single borrower" limitation. The primary objective of this limitation is to safeguard the bank's depositors
by spreading the loans among a relatively large number of
persons engaged in different lines of business.""
1. The General Lending Limit Rule
The limitation under 12 U.S.C. § 84 originally provided
that "total obligations" to a single borrower could not exceed
10% of the bank's unimpaired capital and surplus. However, §
401 of the 1982 Banking Act amends, in its entirety, 12 U.S.C.
§ 84.165 The most fundamental changes in the law are an increase in the general statutory ceiling from 10% to 15% of a
national bank's unimpaired capital and surplus, the creating
of an additional secured 10% ceiling and the adoption of
newly defined general terms. Some prior statutory exceptions
have been deleted while other exceptions are preserved, with
some alteration of terms or integration elsewhere into the
statute. An additional statutory exception for loans secured
by segregated deposit accounts was also enacted.
The 1982 Banking Act confers upon the Comptroller authority to prescribe implementing regulations and to issue
rules for aggregation or combination of loans. In April 1983,
the Comptroller issued its Revised Rule on Lending Limits
(the revised regulation) to implement the Act.166
164. See generally, Glidden, National Banks Lending Limits and the Comptroller's Regs.: A Clarification, 101 BANKING L.J. 430 (1984).
165. Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 402, 96
Stat. 1469 (1982).
166. Department of the Treasury National Bank Lending Limits, 48 Fed. Reg.
15,844 (1983) (codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 32.1-.111), Department of the Treasury, Interpretive Rulings; National Banks; Definition of Capital, 48 Fed. Reg. 56,359 (1983)
revises the .definition of capital; see also supra note 105. Comptroller temporary forbearance rule providing a substitute (and more lenient) lending limit (as well as a
capital adequacy requirement) for national banks with charged-off agricultural and
energy loans; 12 C.F.R. § 7.1100 (1986).
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The ability of national banks to allocate within a bank
holding company unit is dealt with and modified by the 1982
Banking Act's revisions to section 23A of the Federal Reserve
Act.

16 7

(a) Structural Changes
The 1982 Banking Act restructured section 84 to address
separately limits for loans and extensions of credit that are
unsecured'6 8 and secured. 169 Subsection (b) of section 84 contains definitions of terms used throughout the section. Subsection (c) enumerates ten exceptions to the general limits of
subsections (a)(1) and (2). Subsection (d) authorizes the
Comptroller to administer and carry out the purposes of the
section and to provide rules concerning the aggregation of
loans.
(b) Definitional Changes
The 1982 Banking Act includes a number of significant
definitions.
(1) Loans and Extensions of Credit
The 1982 Banking Act amends section 84 to apply to the
"total loans and extensions of credit" by a national association and its domestic operating subsidiaries to a single customer. "Loans and extensions of credit" are defined as:
all direct or indirect advances of funds to a person made on
the basis of any obligation of that person to repay the funds
repayable from specific property pledged by or on behalf of
the person and, to the extent specified by the Comptroller of
the Currency, such term shall also include any liability of a
national banking association to advance funds to or on behalf of a person pursuant to a contractual commitment
170

167.
168.
169.
170.

See infra notes 304-40 and accompanying text.
12 U.S.C. § 84(a)(1) (Supp. 1 1983).
Id. at § 84(a)(2).
Id. at § 84(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
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The 1982 Banking Act thus utilizes a broader definition for
applicable transactions. The act gives the Comptroller of the
Currency the authority to determine when a contractual commitment to advance funds should be included in a person's
71
liability.1
(2) Person
Section 84, as amended by the 1982 Banking Act, refers
to loans and extensions of credit outstanding at any one time
to a particular "person." This term is defined for the first
time and includes: "an individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, joint venture, association, trust, estate, business
trust, corporation, sovereign government or agency, instrumentality, or political subdivision thereof, or any similar
entity or organization. ' 172 Thus the definition includes
individuals and most forms of entities. In addition, the revised
corporations and estates
regulation clarifies that non-profit
17 3
"persons.'
as
are included
(c) Nonrelation to Investment Limitations
Under the 1982 Banking Act, the lending limits are separate and distinct from the investment limits applicable to national banks. A national bank may make loans to a customer
up to the applicable lending limit and may own investment
that the
securities issued by the same customer to the extent
174
regulation.
or
statute
by
permitted
is
investment
2.

Loans and Extensions of Credit and Exceptions

The revised regulation provides that a national bank may
grant loans and extensions of credit up to 15% of its
unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus to any "person."
A national bank may also grant additional loans and extensions of credit to a single person up to 10% of its unimpaired
capital and surplus, provided that the transactions will be
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id.
Id. at § 84(b)(2) (Supp. 1 1983).
12 C.F.R. § 32.2(b) (1986).
See id. at § 32.111.
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fully secured by readily marketable collateral having a marketing value, as determined by reliable and continuously
available price quotations.' 7" The definition of "loans and extension of credit" has already been discussed. Unimpaired
capital and surplus of a national bank have the same meaning
as given to such terms under the new Comptroller Capital Ad17 6
equacy Regulations.
(a) Commitments and Advances
Within the definition of a "loan and extension of credit"
is a "contractual commitment to advance funds" by a national
bank. Under the 1982 Banking Act, the Comptroller was
granted the authority to determine when a "contractual commitment to advance funds" should be included in a person's
liability under the lending limit rules.1 77 Under the revised
regulation, "contractual commitment to advance funds"
means: (1) an obligation of the bank to pay a third party upon
default by the bank's customer to perform under a contract or
(2) an obligation by the bank to guarantee or to stand as a
17
surety for the benefit of a third party. 1
Some types of commitments are treated in the same manner as a loan for lending limit purposes and are subject to all
the section 84 exceptions. Such commitments include letters
of credit, surety obligations, guaranties, puts and similar obligations of the bank. For purposes of this provision, a standby
letter of credit is an arrangement that represents an obligation by the issuing bank to repay funds borrowed by, or advanced to, the bank's customer; to make payment on an obligation undertaken by the customer; or to make payment on
an obligation defaulted upon by the customer.1 7' Bank guaranties of obligations of affiliates are governed by section 23A
of the Federal Reserve Act and not by the lending limit
rules. 18
175. 12 U.S.C. § 84(a)(2). See infra notes 203-08 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the additional 10% secured limit.
176. See supra notes 114-23 and accompanying text.
177. 12 U.S.C. § 84(b)(1).
178. See 12 C.F.R. § 32.2(d) (1986).
179. See id. at § 32.2(e).
180. See infra notes 304-40 and accompanying text.
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A common instrument excepted from the lending limit is
a commercial letter of credit and similar instruments through
which the issuing bank "expects the beneficiary to draw upon
the issuer; does not 'guarantee' payment of the money; and
does not provide for payment in the event of default by the
account party (the bank customer)."' 181
Under the revised regulation, the Comptroller has retained (through a definitional exclusion) the prior provisions
under which undisbursed loan funds and undisbursed loan
commitments are not considered loans for lending limit purposes. 8 2 As prudent bank procedure, the Comptroller suggests
in the supplementary information to the revised regulation
that a bank maintain adequate internal procedures to monitor
commitments made to ensure that disbursals do not exceed
the lending limits at any time.
(b) Overdrafts
Overdrafts and advances of funds against uncollected balances are "loans and extensions of credit" subject to the lending limit. This rule applies to any overdraft whether "inadvertent" or "insignificant." The only exception to the rule is in
relationship to "intra-day" or "daylight" overdrafts.'8 3
(c) Third-Party Paper
When a national bank purchases third-party paper under
a repurchase agreement that obligates the seller to repurchase
the paper in the event of a default or at the end of a stated
period after default, the seller's repurchase agreement is subject to the lending limit applicable to such seller. The transaction is measured under section 84 by the total outstanding
balance of the paper less any seller's reserve. If the seller
agrees to a limited repurchase agreement, the seller's loans or
extensions of credit are measured by the amount of paper the
seller may be obligated to repurchase. If the bank has no recourse against the seller and retains a portion of the paper's
181. See 12 C.F.R. § 32.2(d); see also OCC, Staff Interpretive Letter, [Current]
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,531 (May 22, 1986).
182. 12 C.F.R. § 32.2(d).
183. See id. at § 32.105.
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purchase price as collateral, then the paper is not a loan or
84
extension of credit to the seller.1
The purchase of third-party paper does not come within
the definition of "loans and extensions of credit" under 12
U.S.C. § 84; therefore, the Comptroller asserts that the
purchase of third-party paper is not an "extension of credit"
under 12 U.S.C. § 375a and the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation. This assertion is made even though the regulation
does not specifically incorporate the Comptroller's interpretation of section 84.185
A proposal by a national bank to purchase notes issued
by a financial institution from third-party holders of the notes
constitutes a loan to the financial institution. The presence of
a repurchase agreement from the holders does not modify the
aggregation of the notes to the financial institutions. 186
(d) Open Accounts
Under the revised regulation, national banks are authorized to purchase open accounts or accounts receivable. Accounts receivable represent a right to payment for goods or
services. Evidence of this right to payment may be documented by notes, drafts, invoices, purchase orders or account
entries. In order that a sale of open accounts to a national
bank not be considered obligations of the seller subject to the
lending limit, the seller must indorse the paper without
7
recourse.18
(e) Personal Property Leases
Under the revised regulation, personal property leases financed by a national bank are obligations subject to the lending limit. The limit applies to funds actually advanced under
184. See id. at § 32.104.
185. OCC, Staff Interpretive Letter, [Current] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
85,484 (October 15, 1985).
186. See OCC, Staff Interpretive Letters, [Current] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
85,484, 85,494, 85,498 (Oct. 15, 1984, Jan. 9, 1985 and Mar. 27, 1985).
187. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.1105 (1986).
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a lease. To determine whether a national bank may grant additional loans and extensions of credit to a person, funds advanced to the customer under all outstanding leases must be
taken into account. This calculation includes leases consummated prior to June 12, 1979, the effective date of the interpretive ruling concerning personal property leases. Lease renewal agreements entered into prior to this date may be
188
honored without violation of the lending limit.

(f) Third-Party Guaranties
The accommodation party provision of the revised regulation merely states:
The liability of a drawer, endorser or guarantor who does
not receive any of the proceeds, or the benefit of the proceeds, of the loan or extension of credit is not a loan or extension of credit to such person for purposes of this part unless one of the ["common enterprise"] tests ...
is
satisfied.189
Therefore, the tests under the revised regulation appear to be
whether the guarantor receives any of the proceeds or the
benefit of the proceeds, or is engaged in a common enterprise
with the borrower. 90
Introduced into the revised regulation's provisions on
third-party guaranties is the concept of receiving the "benefit" of the proceeds (a test previously applied by the Comptroller on an informal basis). The application of this test does
not appear entirely clear. Absent further guidance from the
Comptroller's Office, and in light of the specific inclusion of
the term "benefit of the proceeds" in the revised regulations,
a bank may wish to consider taking the conservative position
that third-party guaranties by dominant shareholders or dominant partners of a borrower would be deemed to be "loans or
extensions of credit" for lending limit purposes.
188. See id. at § 7.3400.
189. See id. at § 32.101.
190. Cf. id. at § 7.1125(b); OCC, Staff Interpretive Letter, [Current] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,461 (May 4, 1984). Notwithstanding the foregoing, this author
abides by his analysis of the regulation.
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(g) Participations,Loans, Acceptances and Standby Letters
of Credit
A national bank may reduce its loans and extensions of
credit (which include loans, the discount of its own acceptances and standby letters of credit) by selling a nonrecourse
participation. Such a participation must share the credit risk
in proportion to the interests of the participants. Last-in-firstout (LIFO) participations can reduce the outstanding loans of
the seller but must provide for bona fide sharing of risk in the
event of a default or a comparable event defined in the participation agreement.19 1 In light of these requirements, a bank
may wish to reexamine its standard participation agreements
used in relevant circumstances.
(h) Accrued or Discounted Interest
Under the revised regulation, the amount of loans or extensions of credit subject to the lending limits does not in1 92
clude accrued or discounted interest.
(i) Charge-Offs, Unenforceable Obligations
The lending limits apply to transactions charged off the
bank's records but does not apply to obligations that have become unenforceable by reason of a discharge in bankruptcy or
being no longer legally enforceable. Transactions in the latter
category may become unenforceable due to: (i) the expiration
of the statute of limitations, (ii) judicial decision or (iii) regulatory order. The Comptroller recommends that an opinion of
counsel indicating that the loan or extension of credit is no
longer legally enforceable be obtained prior to taking advantage of this new exception.1 93
(j) General Obligation Loans
A loan or extension of credit granted to a state or political subdivision that constitutes a "general obligation" of the
191. See 12 C.F.R. § 32.107. See also OCC, Staff Interpretive Letter, [Current]
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,420 (Apr. 4, 1983).
192. See 12 C.F.R. § 32.108 (1986).
193. See id. at § 32.106.
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entity is excepted from the lending limit. Similarly, a transaction guaranteed or fully secured by a "general obligation" is
excepted from the lending limit. A bank entering into such a
loan should obtain the opinion of counsel that such arrangements are valid and enforceable obligations of the borrower."9 4
(k) Loans to IndustrialDevelopment Authorities
Extensions of credit to an industrial development authority or similar public entity created for the purpose of constructing and leasing facilities to industrial occupants, including health care facilities, are not loans or extensions of credit
to the authority if certain criteria are met. Such transactions
are considered loans to the lessee (industrial occupant) if:
The bank relies on the credit of the industrial occupant in
making the loan;. . . the authority's liability with respect to
the loan is limited solely to whatever interest it has in the
particular facility; ... the authority's interest is assigned to
the bank as security for the loan or a note from the lessee to
the bank provides a higher order of security than the assignment of the lease; and . . . the industrial occupant's lease
rentals are assigned and paid directly to the bank. 19 5
(1) Federal Funds
Federal reserve funds sold by a national bank to another
depository institution may not be subject to the lending limit.
Historically, the term "federal funds" referred to the balance
of a bank's reserve account with a Federal Reserve bank in
excess of its reserve requirement. These funds were made
available for sale to other financial institutions experiencing a
reserve deficiency, usually on a one day basis. Currently, federal funds transactions are the disposal of excess reserve balances or other immediately available funds for one business
194. See id. at § 32.109.
195. See id. at § 32.110. The Comptroller's Office has opined that a bank's
purchase of industrial revenue bonds without recourse against the selling bank (but
accompanied by a "bond-sale option agreement") constitutes a borrowing for purposes of 12 U.S.C. § 84 (Ltr. No. 262, dated June 27, 1983). Also, industrial revenue
bonds where an issue held by one holder or a small group of local holders are treated
as loans. OCC, Staff Interpretive Letters, [Current] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1
85,263 and 85,426 (Mar. 10, 1981 and June 17, 1983).
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day or under a continuing contract. A continuing contract is
an agreement that remains in effect for more than one business day but has no specified maturity and does not require
advance notice to terminate. These transactions are not subject to the lending limit. However, the Comptroller has ruled
that federal funds transactions of a longer duration are subject to the lending limit.19 6
(m) Securities (Repurchase Agreements)
Purchases of a list of fifteen specified "Type I" investment securities 1 97 by a national bank under an agreement to
resell at the end of a stated time period are not subject to the
lending limit. 9 8 All other types of securities purchased under
these agreements are obligations subject to the lending
limit. 19
(n) Loans by Bank Foreign Subsidiaries or by Edge Act
Corporations
Loans or extensions of credit granted by bank-owned foreign subsidiaries or by Edge Act corporations are not combined with bank transactions with the same borrowers for section 84 lending limit purposes. The principal reason behind
this decision is that the imposition of the lending limit on foreign subsidiaries would place banks at a competitive disadvantage in foreign markets. However, the FRB regulation K
separately provides for a 10% limitation on loans by an Edge
Act corporation and its subsidiaries to any person and separately requires that the liabilities of any one person to a majority-owned foreign bank or Edge Act corporation be combined for FRB lending limit purposes with liabilities of the
same person to the FRB member bank. 00
196. See 12 C.F.R. § 32.102 (1986).
197. See id. at § 1.3(c).
198. See id. at § 32.103(a).
199. See id. at § 32.103(b).
200. See id. at § 211.6(b)(ii).
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(o) Loans to Bank Affiliates
Another exception by virtue of another statute is loans by
national banks to their "affiliates." Congress preempted the
application of section 84 to transactions with affiliates with
the passage of a simplified and stricter section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act.20 '
(p) Loans by Domestic Operating Subsidiaries
Loans and extensions of credit made to a borrower by a
national bank's domestic operating subsidiaries are consolidated with loans to the same borrower by the bank under section 84.202
3.

The 10% Secured Limit and Other Additional Limits

The 1982 Banking Act and the revised regulation provide
for certain limits in addition to the 15% unsecured limit.
Loans secured by collateral under the additional 10% general
limit must be secured by readily marketable collateral having
a current market value of 100% of the loan or extension of
20 3
credit.
(a) The Type of Collateral
The permitted collateral must be "readily marketable" financial instruments such as: instruments traded on a national
security exchange including stocks, notes, bonds and debentures; OTC margin stocks; commercial paper; negotiable certificates of deposit; banker's acceptances; and shares in money
and mutual funds of the type that issue shares in which a
bank may perfect a security interest. Bullion also qualifies as
readily marketable collateral. 20 '
(b) Valuation
Valuation of the permitted collateral is determined by
quotations based on actual transactions on an auction or a
201.
202.
203.
204.

12 U.S.C. § 371c; see infra text accompanying notes 304-40.
See 12 C.F.R. § 32.1(c) (1986).
See 12 U.S.C. § 84(a)(2).
See 12 C.F.R. § 32.4(c).

1986]

"Reregulated" Banking Environment

similarly available daily bid-and-ask-price market. The Comptroller has abandoned its attempt set forth in the December,
1982 proposed regulation to require 115% of collateral value.
Under the revised regulation, if the collateral value falls below
100% of the outstanding loan, the loan must be brought into
conformance within five business days. If conformance is not
made within this time period, a violation of the law occurs.
Exceptions are granted to the five-day rule in only the case of
judicial proceedings, regulatory actions or other extraordinary
occurrences that prevent the bank from taking action. 0 5 A national bank is required to implement adequate internal procedures to ensure that the collateral value requirement is met at
all times.2 6
Financial instruments in foreign currencies convertible
into United States dollars must be revalued against foreign
exchange rates and repriced against the current market value
monthly.
(c) Other Concerns
Because of maintenance of "full security" and avoidance
of a shortfall, a bank may wish to consider requiring, as prudent banking practice, more than the 100% requirement and/
or may wish to adjust its standard loan forms to include provisions for the prompt furnishing of additional collateral in
shortfall situations or (in lieu thereof) a corresponding
paydown of the indebtedness.
National banks and their borrowers may be unable to
utilize fully this "full security" provision of the general limit
due to limitations set forth in other laws. One such limitation
is set forth in the Federal Reserve Act and generally provides
that the FRB may fix the percentage of each Federal Reserve
System member bank loans secured by stocks or bonds.2 0 7 The
other law, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended,
authorizes the FRB to regulate credit extended for the purpose of carrying securities.20
205. See id. at § 32.4(f).
206. See id. at § 32.4(d).
207. See 12 U.S.C. § 248(m).
208. See 15 U.S.C. § 78g(d); 12 C.F.R. § 221 (Reg. U); see also infra text accompanying notes 341-400.

Oklahoma City University Law Review

592

[Vol. XI

(d) Other Additional Limits
The 1982 Banking Act and the revised regulation provide
additional lending authorization over the basic 15% limit for
the following transactions:
(1) Loans and extensions of credit arising from the discount
of negotiable or non-negotiable installment consumer paper
carrying the full recourse indorsement or unconditional
guarantee of the party discounting or transferring the same
may be made to the extent of 10% of capital and surplus in
addition to the 15% limit for a total of 25% of the capital
account." 9
(2) Loans secured by warehouse receipts, bills of lading or
similar documents covering readily marketable commodities
may be made to the extent of 35% of the capital and surplus
in addition to the 15% limit, provided that the market value
of the commodities securing the transaction are at least
115% of the outstanding amount of the loan extended and
the commodities are fully insured when it is customary to do
SO.210

(3) Certain types of loans when secured by livestock may be
made in an amount of 10% of the capital account in addition to the 15% limit if they meet certain tests. " '
4.

The Aggregation Rules

Section 84 no longer specifically addresses the combination or aggregation of loans to a separate borrower. The
amended statute authorizes the Comptroller to determine
when loans are to be combined.21 2 Pursuant to the statutory
grant of authority, the Comptroller has issued aggregation
rules in the revised regulation. The rules became effective on
June 14, 1983, and are codified at 12 C.F.R. § 32.5.
The aggregation rules consist of a general rule and separate special rules for corporations, partnerships and other associations and foreign governments, their agencies and instrumentalities. The rules replace in their entirety prior
209.
210.
211.
212.

See
See
See
See

12
12
12
12

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§ 84(c)(8); 12 C.F.R. § 32.6(h).
§ 84(c)(3); 12 C.F.R. § 32.6(c).
§ 84(c)(9); 12 C.F.R. § 32.6(i).
§ 84(d)(2) (1982).
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aggregation rules under 12 C.F.R. § 7.1310 (corporations), §
7.1320 (partnerships and associations) and § 7.1330 (foreign
governments)." 3
(a) The General Rule
The general rule applicable to all situations not specifically provided for in the revised regulation is that loans or
extensions of credit are to be combined with those to other
persons when "the proceeds of the loans or extensions of
credit are to be used for the direct benefit of the other person
or persons or . . . a 'common enterprise' is deemed to exist
2' 14
between the persons.
The revised regulation substantially modifies the Comptroller definition of "common enterprise" as contained in its
December, 1982, proposed rules.2 15 For purposes of the general aggregation rule, and otherwise for purposes of the other
aggregation rules, a "common enterprise" exists per se:
(ii) Where the expected source of repayment for each loan or
extension of credit is the same for each person .... [or]
(iii) Where loans or extensions of credit are made to persons
who are related through common control, including where
one person is controlled by another person, . . . [and] such
persons are engaged in interdependent businesses or there is
216
a substantial financial interdependence among them.
Control is presumed to exist when:
(A) One or more persons acting in concert directly or indirectly own, control, or have power to vote 25 % or more of a
class of voting securities of another person; or
213. 12 C.F.R. § 32.5(b), (c) & (d) (1986).
214. Id. at § 32.5(a)(1) (emphasis added).
215. See OCC, Proposed Rule: National Bank Lending Limits, 47 Fed. Reg.
56,862 (1982).
216. 12 C.F.R. § 32.5(a)(2). On June 14, 1983, the effective date of the new lending limit regulations, the comptroller issued a minor amendment to the final regulations; see OCC, National Bank Lending Limits, Amendment to Final Rule, 48 Fed.
Reg. 27,224 (1983), which also contains a discussion of the various comments received
on the final regulations.
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(B) One or more persons acting in concert control, in any
manner, the election of a majority of the directors, trustees,
or other persons exercising similar functions of another person; or

(C) Any other circumstances exist which indicate that one or
more persons acting in concert directly or indirectly exercise
a controlling influence over the management or policies of
another person.2" 7
Substantial financial interdependence exists
(iii) [W]hen 50 percent or more of one person's gross receipts or gross expenditures (on an annual basis) are derived
from transactions with one or more persons related through
common control . .

.

.Gross receipts and expenditures in-

clude gross revenues expenses, inter-company loans,
dividends, capital contributions, and similar receipts or
payments." 8
This 50% test would not be applicable to unrelated parties
(e.g., a manufacturer selling all its product to an unaffiliated
retail chain). Because of the difficulty in determining "common control" and "substantial financial interdependence," a
bank may wish to consider obtaining appropriate written representations on these matters in loan transactions which raise
"common enterprise" concerns, or; "(iv) [If] separate persons
borrow from a bank for the purpose of acquiring the business
enterprise of which those persons own more than 50 percent
of the voting securities."2119 The Comptroller takes the position that the aggregation rules will be applied with flexibly.
For example, the Comptroller may be receptive to the substitution of a corporation for a partnership in a loan restructure
for purposes of avoiding the lending limit aggregation rules.
From a practical point of view, whether a common enterprise
exists depends on a realistic evaluation of the facts and circumstances of a particular transaction.2 2
217.
218.
219.
220.

12
Id.
Id
Id.

C.F.R. § 32.5(a)(2)(v).
at § 32.5(a)(2).
at § 32.5(a)(2)(iv).
at § 32.5(a)(2)(i).
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(b) The Rules for Corporations
The revised regulation provides greater flexibility for a
national bank lending to corporate groups than the prior regulations. For example, no longer will loans made by a bank to a
parent and to its subsidiary be automatically combined, unless a common enterprise exists.2"'2 Under the revised rule:
"Loans or extensions of credit to a person and its subsidiary
or to subsidiaries of one person need not be combined where
the bank has determined that the person and subsidiaries involved are not engaged in a 'common enterprise' .
"...,222
Notwithstanding the new flexibility, loans and extensions of
credit to a "corporate group" are subject to an aggregate lending limit. The limit, which is not to exceed 50% of the bank's
unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus, applies whether
or not a common enterprise exists among persons in the corporate group."' A "corporate group" is defined to include a
person (which term embraces an individual and partnership,
as well as a corporation) and all of its subsidiaries; 2 4 thus, an
individual or a partnership can be a corporate parent. The
term subsidiary means a corporation of which a "person"
owns or beneficially owns more than 50% of the voting
stock.22 5 By definition, a "corporate group" cannot exist
among a person and controlled partnerships. 2 6
(c) The Rules for Partnerships
The rules concerning aggregation of partnership loans are
based upon the premise that partnership loans are unique
since each partner is jointly and severally liable for all partnership liabilities. The revised rules continue the prior approach as follows: "Loans or extensions of credit to a partnership, joint venture, or association shall . . . be considered
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at § 32.5(b)(2).
at § 32.5(b)(3).
at § 32.5(b)(1).
at §§ 32.5(b)(1) & (3).
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loans or extensions of credit to each member of such partnership, joint venture, or association. ' 227 This rule can be explained by an example given by the Comptroller in the supplementary information to the revised regulation:
Thus, assuming that a bank's lending limit is $100,000, it
may extend $50,000 of credit to A and B who are general
partners of the partnership, AB, and it may also lend
$50,000 to AB (the partnership). This is because AB's loans
will be attributed individually to both A and B. If, however,
B is also a member of partnership BC, which desires to borrow $50,000, the bank will be unable to make the loan to
BC, since both AB's $50,000 loan and BC's $50,000 loan
made would be attributed to B, who already has a $50,000
personal loan. 2 8
The rule under the revised regulation affirms the position
that, absent the existence of a "common enterprise," loans or
extensions of credit to members of a partnership should not
be attributed to the partnership. 2 9
The existence of a common enterprise among two or more
partnerships would most probably arise where two or more
common general partners exercise a "controlling influence"
over the management of each partnership and where such
partnership businesses are interdependent or where there is a
substantial financial interdependence among them."'
The partnership aggregation rules are not applicable to
limited partners in a limited partnership or to members of a
joint venture or association if such partners or members, by
the terms of the partnership or membership agreement, are
not to be held liable for all the debts or actions of the partnership, joint venture, or association and otherwise do not hold
themselves out to third parties as general partners.2 3 ' Even
where such a situation exits, the taking of a third-party guaranty from any such joint venturer or member would probably
negate the requirement of effective limited liability. Moreover,
limited partners and such other partners and members would
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at § 32.5(c)(1).
See OCC, National Bank Lending Limits, 48 Fed. Reg. 15,844 (1983).
12 C.F.R. § 32.5(c)(2).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at § 32.5(c)(3) (emphasis added).
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be subject to aggregation rules if they came under one of the
''common enterprise" tests.
(d) The Rule for Foreign Governments
The rule in the revised regulation reaffirms the Comptroller's position that loans to government owned corporations are
to be governed by the rules applicable to sovereign loans and
retains the "means" and "purpose" test contained in the current regulations. 2312 Such loans would be combined only if they
fail to meet either of the following tests at the time the loan
or extension of credit is made: "(i) The borrower has resources
or revenue of its own sufficient over time to service its debt
obligations (i.e., 'means test'); [or] (ii) The purpose of the loan
or extension of credit is consistent with the purposes of the
borrower's general business (i.e., 'purpose test'). 2 3 3 To
demonstrate that the "means" and "purpose" tests have been
satisfied, a bank must assemble and retain in its files prescribed documents, including: a statement describing the legal
status and degree of financial and operational autonomy of
the borrowing entity, three-year financial statements of the
borrowing entity and financial statements for each year the
loan or extension of credit is outstanding, the bank's assessments of the borrower's means of servicing the loan and the
loan agreement or other written statement from the borrower
clearly describing the purpose of the loan or extension of
2 34
credit
5.

Statutory Exceptions to the Lending Limit

Loans and extensions of credit may exceed the general
lending limit if they qualify under one of the ten statutory
exceptions or other rules of exclusion set forth in the revised
regulation. The following chart lists the statutory exceptions
existing under revised 12 U.S.C. § 84 and the revised
regulation.
232. Id. at § 32.5(d)(1)(i) & (ii); id. at § 7.1330 (1982). Substitution of borrowers
does not create a violation of 12 U.S.C. § 84. OCC, Staff Interpretive Letter, [Current]
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) $ 85,452 (April 25, 1984).
233. 12 C.F.R. § 32.5(d)(1)(i) & (ii).
234. Id. at § 32.5(d)(2)(i)-(v).
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12 U.S.C. § 84 Exceptions
Exception
1

Topic
Discount of commercial or
business paper.

C.F.R. Regulation
§ 32.6(a)

2

Bankers' acceptance
Loans secured by bills of
lading or warehouse covering readily marketable
staples.

§ 32.6(b)

Loans secured by United
States obligations.
Loans to or guaranteed by
a federal agency.
Loans secured by segregated deposit accounts.
Loans to financial institutions with the approval of
the Comptroller.
Discount of installment
consumer paper.
Loans secured by livestock
or dairy cattle.
Loans to Student Loan
Marketing Associations.

§ 32.6(d)

3

4
5
6
7

8
9
10

§ 32.6(c)

§ 32.6(e)
§ 32.6(f)
§ 32.6(g)

§ 32.6(h)
§ 32.6(i)
§ 32.6(j)

Other transactions, while not excepted by statute from
the lending limit, may be exempt from the lending limit by
means of the Comptroller's authority to promulgate lending
limit regulations, or may be excepted because they are governed by other laws or regulations.
Negotiable and non-negotiable certificates of deposit issued by the lending bank qualify for exception (6)."3' Other
bank negotiable certificates of deposit do not qualify for the
exception.2 3 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
235. OCC, Staff Interpretive Letter, [Current] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
84,475 & 85,490 (August 17, 1983, and December 17, 1984).
236. Id.
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Participation Certificates (FHLMC guaranteed PCs) do not
qualify for exception (4) or exception (5).237 Standby letters of
credit issued by a bank to the benefit of the lending bank do
not qualify under any of the lending limit exceptions and are
not "readily marketable collateral" under the additional 10%
of capital and surplus limit. 23 a The Comptroller has explored
various options or automobile lease-note financing exceptions
(8), in an interpretive letter.2 39
6.

Statutory Liability

The 1982 Banking Act does not change the liability imposed by the National Bank Act upon directors of a national
bank for knowingly violating or knowingly permitting a bank
officer or agent to violate any provision of such Act, including
the lending limit provisions. Accordingly, a director who consents to or participates in an excessive loan is liable for damages suffered by the bank, its shareholders or other persons.2 0°
In addressing this question of director liability, there are
three relevant issues: Is the obligation to the borrower in excess of the single borrower limitation? Did the director knowingly make or assent to the making of the loan? What portion
of the loan proceeds were lost?
Mere negligence of a director for an excessive loan is
probably not sufficient to incur liability under the statute.
However, if a director deliberately refrains from investigating
that which it was his duty to investigate, any resulting violation of the statute will be regarded as in effect intentional.2 "
In addition to the statutory liability under the National
Bank Act, directors of national banks have common law duties to exercise due care, prudence and undivided loyalties in
237. OCC, Staff Interpretive Letter, [Current] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1
85,480 (September 10, 1984).
238. OCC, Staff Interpretive Letter, [Current] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
85,492 (December 31, 1984).
239. OCC, Staff Interpretive Letter, [Current] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1
85,497 (March 15, 1985).
240. See 12 U.S.C. § 93 (1986).
241. See Del Junco v. Conover, 682 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1146 (1983); but cf. Larimore v. Conover, 775 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1985), rev'd on
reh'g en banc, 789 F.2d 1244 (7th Cir. 1986).
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their role as directors of the bank.242 A right of contribution
may exist among bank officers for a section 84 violation and
award of damages.
7.

Forbearance Rules

The Comptroller has recently enacted a rule providing a
substitute, and more lenient, lending limit for national banks
with charged-off agricultural and energy loans.243
B.

Savings and Loan Associations

The FSLIC has ruled that with respect to a federally insured S&L (and any of its "service corporations") the "total
balances" of all outstanding loans to "one borrower" must not
exceed an amount equal to 10% of an institution's withdrawable accounts, or an amount equal to an institution's net
worth, whichever amount is less.2 44 Effective January 1, 1984,
an exception exists for any loan not exceeding $500,000 (subject to annual Consumer Price Index adjustments).2 4 5 In addition, the single borrower limit for commercial loans is the
same as the limit for national banks under revised section
84.246 Calculation of aggregate limitations is geared to funds
actually advanced (except for standby letters of credit) and
guaranties or suretyship obligations.2 4 7
The term "one borrower," for purposes of the FSLIC limitation, includes the following:
Any person or entity that is, or that upon the making of the
loan will become, the obligor on a loan ....
Nominees of
such obligor; [and] all persons, trusts, sydicates, partnerships, and corporations of which such obligor is a nominee, a
beneficiary, a member, a general partner, a limited partner
owning an interest of ten percent or more (based on value of
242. See generally W. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECch. 8 (3d ed. 1978).
243. OCC, Comment on National Banks Lending Limits, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,303
(1986); see supra note 105.
244. 12 C.F.R. § 563.9-3(b)(1) (1986).
245. Id.
246. Id. at § 563.9-3(b)(2).
247. Id. at § 563.9-3(a)(2).
TORS,
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his contribution), or a record or beneficial stockholder owing
ten percent or more of the capital stock [of such obligor]. 4 5
In the case of a loan assumed by a third party with the consent of the lending insured institution, the former debtor will
no longer be deemed an "obligor. 2 49 In calculating its aggregate loans to "one borrower," an S&L must add the sum of: (i)
the amount of the loan and, (ii) the "total balances" of all
outstanding loans owed to the S&L and its affiliated service
corporations by the borrower. Standby letters of credit and
guaranties of suretyship obligations are treated as outstanding
loans to the account party or principal, rather than loan
suggestions.250
The FHLBB has announced that, although federal
thrift
institutions and national banks are subject to the same
unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus limitations on
commercial loans to one borrower, not all of the same national
bank single borrower loan limitations will be applicable to
such thrift institutions. Thrift institutions will be required to
rely on FHLBB rules and interpretations in the event of a
conflict with Comptroller regulations. For example, the
FHLBB has its own definition of one borrower, and does not
follow the Comptroller's attribution regulations.2 5 '

C. Relationship to Underlying ContractualCommitment
A banking institution may not raise the statutory lending
limitation as a defense to avoid or limit its underlying contractual limitations with a non-conspiring borrower252

248. Id. at § 563.9-3(a)(1)(i)(a)-(c).
249. Id. at § 563.9-3(a)(1)(ii).
250. See FHLBB, Final Rules on New S&L Powers, 48 Fed. Reg. 23,032 (1983).
251. See FHLBB Memo. No. T-73, Fed. Guide, supra note 78, at 1 10,405;
FHLBB, Final Rule on "Common Enterprises," 50 Fed. Reg. 45,089 (1985).
252. See, e.g., First Am. Nat'l Bank v. Alcorn Inc., 361 So.2d 481, 489 (Miss.
1978).
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RESTRICTIONS: LOANS TO "INSIDERS"

The Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate
Control Act of 1978 (FIRA) was enacted by Congress in response to abusive practices engaged in by bank insiders.2 5 3
These practices included; (i) loans to bank insiders that were
excessive in amount or preferential as to terms, and/or that
involved greater than normal risk, and (ii) receipt of preferential treatment by a bank insider because of his ability to control the distribution of correspondent banking business. 54 Title IV, Part B of the 1982 Banking Act affected numerous
amendments-to the original FIRA provisions.
A.

Introduction to FIRA

A primary objective of Titles I, VIII and IX of FIRA,2 55
as amended, is to limit preferential and excessive loans to
bank insiders. To achieve this objective, FIRA imposes limitations on credit terms, aggregate lending limits, overdrafts and
correspondent loans available to insiders. It also requires submission of public and regulatory reports.
The 1982 Banking Act eliminated dollar ceilings on home
loans, educational loans and "other" loans subject to the
25 7
26
banking authorities' limitations on such loans. " The FRB,
Comptroller25 8 and the FDIC2 59 have promulgated separate
regulations implementing the amended FIRA restrictions. The
FDIC regulation adopts its own definitions, does not limit
borrowing by insiders, prohibits preferential lending involving
correspondent banks and requires that insiders report borrowing from their banks and correspondent banks. 2 0 The FRB
253. Act of Nov. 10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
(92 Stat.) 3641 (codified at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).

NEWS

254. See 1978 U.S.

CODE CONG.

& ADMIN.

NEWS

255. Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641.
256. Section 421 of the 1982 Banking Act.
257. 12 C.F.R. § 215 (1986).
258. Id. at § 31.
259. Id. at § 349.
260. Id.

9273, 9367 & 9773.
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and Comptroller have adopted identical definitions and lending limits for bank insiders.2 61 All three banking authorities
have adopted substantially similar reporting requirements.12
Since FRB Regulation 0 is the most comprehensive in
scope, it will be the primary discussion in the ensuing sections. It should be noted that Regulation 0 applies to all FRS
member banks (state and national), except to the extent the
FIRA statutory provisions expressly permit another bank regulator to promulgate regulations on a particular matter. Thus,
for example, with respect to national banks, one must carefully read and interrelate the FIRA provisions, with Regulation 0 and with the Comptroller's FIRA regulation. It should
also be noted that, while the practice of the FRB is to repeat
in its regulation statutory requirements, the Comptroller does
not if the statutory language is clear and binding. As such,
while the Comptroller's regulation appears abbreviated, it is
essentially coextensive in coverage and treatment with Regulation 0.
B. Key Definitions
The following definitions are essential to an understanding of the FIRA restrictions on "insider" loan transactions.
1. Executive Officers
This term includes persons who have authority to participate in "major policymaking functions" whether or not (i) the
officer has an official title, (ii) the title designates the officer as
an assistant, or (iii) the officer serves without compensation.2 "3
There is no definition of "major policy making functions."
However, the FRB regulations provide that the phrase does
not include mere discretion in the granting of loans or discretion limited by policy standards fixed by senior management
of the bank or the company. For example, a manager of a
261. Id. at §§ 215.2, 31.3.
262. Id. at §§ 215.23 (FRB), 31.5 & .6 (Comptroller), 349.4 (FDIC).
263. Id. at § 215.2(d).
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branch generally is not authorized to participate in major policy making functions but may exercise discretion in the per24
formance of his duties.
Generally, executive officers of the bank's parent holding
company or subsidiaries of the holding company are deemed
to be executive officers of the bank.2 6 The chairman of the
board, the president, every vice president, the cashier and the
treasurer of a bank or affiliated company are considered executive officers unless the officer is excluded by resolution of the
board of directors or by the bylaws from participating in
major policymaking functions, and the officer actually does
not participate therein. 6 It should be noted, however, that
"executive officer" does not include an executive officer of the
bank holding company for purposes of the specific restriction
contained in 12 C.F.R. §§ 215.5, 215.8 and 215.9. As a practical matter, a bank's board of directors will eliminate, by resolution, those bank officers not considered to be in a "major
policymaking" position, although the regulators will still look
2 67
to substance over form.
2.

Directors

This term includes bank directors, holding company directors and other holding company subsidiary directors.266 An
advisory director not elected by shareholder vote, not authorized to vote and not providing more than general policy advice
26 9
is not included within the definition.
3.

Principal Shareholders

This term includes persons who own, control or have the
power to vote more than 10% of the bank's outstanding
2 0
stock. 7
264. Id. at n.1.
265. Id.
266. Id. It should be noted, however, that "executive officer" does not include an
executive officer of the bank holding company for purposes of the specific restriction
contained in 12 C.F.R. §§ 215.5, .8 & .9.
267. Id.
268. Id. at § 215.2(c).
269. Id.
270. Id. at § 215.2Q).
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Related Interests

This term includes (i) any company controlled by a bank
insider, (ii) a political or campaign committee controlled by a
bank insider or (iii) the funds or services of a political or campaign committee that will benefit a bank insider.2"7 '
5.

Correspondent Bank

This term covers a bank that maintains one or more correspondent accounts for an FRS member bank during a calendar year that exceed, in the aggregate, an average daily balance during that year of $100,000, or 5% of the member
2 72
bank's total deposits, whichever amount is smaller.
6.

Correspondent Account

The term correspondent account covers an account maintained by a bank with another member bank for the deposit
or placement of funds.2 73 It does not include: (i) time deposits
at prevailing market rates and (ii) an account maintained in
the ordinary course of business solely for the purpose of affecting federal funds transactions at prevailing market rates,
or for the purpose of making eurodollar placements at prevailing market rates.27 4
C. Insider Loans: General Prohibitions
Under FIRA, certain prohibitions pertain to extensions of
credit to insiders of FRS member banks. These provisions include: preferential loans, prior approval, overdrafts and aggregate lending limits.
1. Preferential Loans
Under all circumstances, credit may be extended to an insider only if: (i) the bank would be authorized to extend
credit to borrowers other than the insider, (ii) the terms are
not more favorable than those given to other borrowers, (iii)
271.
272.
273.
274.

Id. at § 215.2(k).
Id. at § 215.21(d).
Id. at § 215.21(c).
Id.
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the officer has submitted a detailed current financial statement and (iv) it is payable on demand if the officer is indebted to any other banks in an amount greater than the
275
amount of credit that could be extended to him at his bank.
2. Prior Approval
Extensions of credit to a bank's executive officers, directors or principal shareholders or to any related interest of that
person, that exceeds the higher of $25,000 or 5% of the bank's
capital and surplus, must receive prior approval of a majority
of the board of directors of the bank.2 7 6 The interested party
may not participate in the voting.2 " Any participation in the
discussion of, or any attempt to influence the voting by the
board of directors regarding extension of credit, constitutes
participation in the vote.2 7 Formal corporate action of the entire board is probably required, as the statute and regulation
refer to the voting processes of the board.27 9 However, if the

extension of credit is made pursuant to a line of credit approved within fourteen months of the date of the extension,
no further approval is required.2 8 In addition, regardless of
the size of the bank, all permitted loans to insiders that exceed $500,000 require the prior board approval.28 '
3. Overdrafts
An extension of credit in the form of an overdraft to a
bank executive officer or director may not be paid by a FRS
member bank unless there is a written, preauthorized, interest-bearing, extension-of-credit plan that specifies a method
of prepayment or unless there is a written preauthorized
transfer of funds from another account.2 82 There is an exception to this rule for inadvertent overdrafts of $1,000 or less
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

12
12
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

U.S.C. § 375(a)(1) (1986).
C.F.R. § 215.4(b).

at § 215.4(b)(2).
at § 215.4(d).
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not overdrawn for more than five business days.2 83 Under this
exception, the insider must be charged the same fee charged
to other customers. 8 4
4.

Aggregate Lending Limit

Extensions of credit to a bank executive officer, principal
shareholder or a related interest of that person are subject to
an aggregate lending limit. 285 This limit is analogous to, but
more comprehensive than, the single borrower limitation provided by 12 U.S.C. § 84. For example, the borrowing of an
executive will be aggregated automatically with the borrowing
of a "related interest." This limitation does not apply to directors, unless they are also executive officers or principal
shareholders.28 6
D.

Loans to Executive Officers -

Specific Restrictions

FIRA amends 12 U.S.C § 375a regarding specific restrictions on loans to executive officers.
1. General Purpose Loans
An FRS member bank may extend credit to its executive
officers, for purposes other than residential or educational
loans, in a dollar amount prescribed under regulation by the
member bank's appropriate federal banking agency.2 8 7 Regulation 0 presently provides a limit of the higher of 21/2 % of
the bank's capital and unimpaired surplus or $25,000, but in
no event more than $100,000.288 Loans to an executive officer
(not to exceed the foregoing limits) and to his "related interests" cannot exceed $500,000 in aggregate without prior board
of directors' approval and (in all events) these aggregated
loans cannot exceed the institution's single borrower lending
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at § 215.4(c). For consideration of the lending limit under 12 U.S.C. § 84,
see supra text accompanying notes 164-252.
286. 12 C.F.R. § 215.4(c).
287. See generally id. at § 215; Mattingly, Insider Lending Restrictions and Reporting Requirements Under the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest

Rate Control Act of 1978, 3

ANN. REV. BANKING

288. 12 C.F.R. § 215.5(c)(3).

L. 21 (1984).
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limit.2 19 Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, the narrower
$100,000 rule applies to a partnership, in which one or more
of the bank's executive officers are partners with a majority
interest, either individually or collectively. The full amount of
the loan to the partnership is, in effect, deemed to be a direct
loan to each involved executive officer.2 90 Notwithstanding the
foregoing clarification, the limits also apply generally to the
extension of credit to the partnership.29 1
2.

First Mortgage Loans

Under section 421(a) of the 1982 Banking Act, a bank
may make a loan, without limit, to finance the residence of an
executive officer.292
3.

Educational Loans

Under section 421(a) of the 1982 Banking Act, no specific
293
restrictions now exist on educational loans.
E.

Transactions With Correspondent Banks

Title VIII of FIRA limits lending transactions between a
bank's insiders and their related interests and correspondent
banks. FIRA, amendments to the BHCA prohibit: (i) the extension of preferential loans by a bank to officers, principal
shareholders, and directors and their related interests of a
correspondent bank, and (ii) the initiation of a correspondent
relationship with a bank, if that bank has extended preferential credit to the initiating bank's principal shareholders, executive officers or directors and their related interests. 9 4 Section
428 of the 1982 Banking Act makes various amendments to
the correspondent banking provisions of FIRA, principally by
289. Id. at § 215.4(b)(1) & (c).
290. Id. at § 215.5(b).
291. Id. An FRB member bank may lend an amount equal to 2.5% of its capital
and unimpaired surplus or $100,000, whichever is lower, to a partnership in which one
or more of its executive officers has a majority interest. Id. at § 215.5(c)(3).
292. 12 U.S.C. § 375a(g)(2)(A); 12 C.F.R. §§ 215.5(b), (c)(2) & (3).
293. 12 U.S.C. § 375a(3); 12 C.F.R. § 215.5(c)(1).
294. 12 U.S.C. § 1972(2)(A), (B) & (D); 12 C.F.R. § 215.20.
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extending such restrictions on preferential insider loans to include loans to "related interests" and by conferring rulemaking authority on the appropriate federal banking agencies.
Although the term "preferential lending" is not defined,
the statute provides that any lending relationship or extension
of credit must be on "substantially the same terms, including
interest rates and collateral as those prevailing at the time for
comparable transactions with other persons and does not involve more than the normal risk of repayment .
"...
295
In summary, the basic purpose of these correspondent account provisions is to prevent banks that maintain correspondent accounts with other banks and the banks with which
these accounts are maintained from making extensions of
credit on a preferential basis to each other's executive officers,
directors or principal shareholders and their related interests.
F.

Reporting Requirements

The amendments to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act
and the BHCA, FIRA and the 1982 Banking Act provide for a
reporting system for insider loan transactions. The banking
authorities have promulgated a uniform system of reporting
concerning loans to bank insiders. In addition all banking authorities have promulgated regulations requiring public disclosure, upon request, of the names of insiders and their related
interests from their own banks or correspondent banks that
equaled or exceeded 5% of the reporting bank's capital or
$500,000, whichever is less.29 6
G. Penalties
FIRA imposes civil penalties on a director, executive officer, bank or other party (such as an aider or abettor) which
is subject to, and which violates, provisions governing extension of credit to insiders.2 91 These penalties may include a fine
of up to $1,000 per day for the continuation of the violation.2
295.
296.
297.
298.

12 U.S.C. § 1972(2)(D).
Id. at §§ 1817(k)(1), 1972(G)(iii); 12 C.F.R. § 215.23.
12 U.S.C. § 504(a) (1982).
12 C.F.R. § 215.11.
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Treble damages may also be imposed for the violation of certain correspondent loan provisions.2 9 9 The violator may also
be liable to the injured party for the cost of the law suit, including attorney's fees.30 0 Section 424 of the 1982 Banking Act
now provides the appropriate federal banking authority with
broad discretionary powers in compromising, modifying or remitting any civil money penalty imposed under FIRA and its
implementing regulations.3 0 1 Bank officers and directors may
also be subject to criminal prosecution if they willfully misapply funds of their bank.3 02 Finally, bank officers and directors
may be suspended or removed from office for violating banking laws or obtaining financial gain at the expense of the
bank. 303
VI.

LOANS TO "AFFILIATES"

Federal banking laws restrict extensions of credit to spe3' 0 4
cial parties, such as "affiliates.
A.

Generally Respecting Special Borrowers

There are restrictions on banking institutions regarding
loans to, and investments in, specified individuals and entities, including: bank examiners, as to whom there is generally
an absolute prohibition;3 0 5 loans to insiders,3 0 6 and loans to affiliates, as to which there are severe limitations under FIRA,
as amended. 07
299. 12 U.S.C. § 1975 (1982).

300. Id.
301. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469.
302. 18 U.S.C. § 656 (1982). Cf. United States v. Christo, 614 F.2d 486 (5th Cir.
1980); United States v. Mann, 517 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1087 (1976).
303. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(1) & (2) (1982).
304. See generally Rose & Talley, Bank Transactions With Affiliates: The New
Section 23A, 100 BANKING L.J. 423 (1983).
305. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 212 (1982).
306. As discussed in supra notes 253-303 and accompanying text.
307. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1982).
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B.

Affiliates

Section 410 of the 1982 Banking Act amends Section 23A
of the Federal Reserve Act.308 The amendment, which is applicable to FDIC insured banks, liberalizes certain restrictions
on transactions with affiliates, closes certain loopholes and reorganizes and clarifies the statute.
1. The Definition of Affiliates
An "affiliate" includes: (i) a company that controls the
bank; (ii) a company that is controlled by the company that
controls the bank; (iii) a bank subsidiary of the bank; (iv) a
company controlled by shareholders who also control the bank
or its holding company; (v) a company in which a majority of
directors also constitutes a majority of the directors of the
bank or its holding company; (vi) an investment company for
which the bank or its affiliates is an investment advisor; (vii) a
company, including a real estate investment trust, sponsored
and advised by the bank or (viii) a company deemed by the
FRB to be an affiliate.3 0 9
Section 371c of the 1982 Banking Act defines "control" as
the power: (a) to vote 25% or more of the voting shares of a
company, excluding situations in which the stock is controlled
in a fiduciary capacity, or (b) to elect a majority of the directors of a company. This definition recognizes that effective
control can be exercised only by a majority of the directors of
a company, but often may be exercised by shareholders holding less than a majority of the voting shares.3 10 In the case of
an interlocking relationship, this translates into any situation
in which: (a) a group of shareholders controls 25% or more of
the shares of both a banking organization and a company, or
(b) a majority of the directors of a banking organization also
constitutes a majority of the directors of a company."'
A company is defined as an "affiliate" by virtue of a trust
arrangement whenever trustees control 25% or more of the
voting shares of a company (banking organization) for the
308.
309.
310.
311.

Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469.
12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(1).
Id. § 371c(b)(3)(A).
Id.
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benefit of shareholders who control 25% or more of the voting
shares of a banking organization (company). 1 2 In addition,
the FRB may determine that a company or shareholder exercises a controlling influence over the management or policies
of the other company, and deem the company to be an
3 13
affiliate.
2.

Affiliates Exempt from Coverage

Certain entities are not considered affiliates of FDIC insured banks. These include: (i) a company, other than a bank,
that is a subsidiary of the bank; (ii) a company engaged solely
in holding the premises of the bank; (iii) a company engaged
solely in conducting a safe deposit business; (iv) a company
that holds United States obligations and (v) a company affiliated as a result of a foreclosed loan. 1
Section 371c excludes only majority owned subsidiaries
from the definition of "affiliates. ' 3 15 In addition, the Board of
Governors of the FRS may define as an affiliate any company
of which a bank owns 25% or more, if transactions with that
company could have adverse effects on the bank. 1
Other entities excluded from the definition of affiliates include 80 % or more owned sister banks or 80% or more owned
subsidiary banks within a bank holding company for all purposes except (in a qualified manner) the restriction on the
purchase of low quality assets. This treatment of multibank
holding companies and the so-called chain banking vehicle
recognizes the similarity of these types of organizations to
branch banking. The minimum 80% ownership rule is intended to protect minority shareholders in banks less than
80% owned. The Comptroller recently ruled that a loan from
a national bank to the trustee of an employee stock ownership
312. Id. at § 371c(b)(1)(C) & (b)(3)(A).
313. Id. at § 371c(b)(3)(A)(iii).
314. Id. at § 371c(b)(2).
315. Id. at § 371c(b)(4).
316. Id. at
317. Id. at

§
§

371c(b)(1)(E).
371c(d)(1); see infra text accompanying notes 320-23.
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plan would not be subject to 12 U.S.C. § 371c because the
trustee is not an affiliate as defined by 12 U.S.C. § 221a.3 18
3.

Transactions Included in Section 371c

The following transactions are included as "covered
transactions" within the restrictions of section 371c: (i) a loan
or extension of credit to an affiliate; (ii) purchase of, or investment in, securities of an affiliate; (iii) purchase of assets of an
affiliate, including assets subject to a repurchase agreement;
(iv) use of securities issued by an affiliate as collateral security
for a loan to any person or company or (v) issuance of a guarantee, acceptance, or letter of credit, including endorsement
or standby letters of credit, on behalf of an affiliate.319 Any
transaction, the proceeds of which are used for the benefit of,
or transferred to, an affiliate constitutes a transaction with an
affiliate.
4.

Special Treatment of the Purchase of Low Quality
Assets

Generally, an FDIC insured bank and its subsidiaries may
not purchase low quality assets from an affiliate. The term
"low quality asset" is an asset: (i) classified as "substandard,"
"doubtful," or "loss," or treated as "other loans especially
mentioned" in the most recent report of examination or inspection of an affiliate prepared by a federal or state examiner; (ii) in a nonaccrual status; (iii) on which principal or interest payments are more than thirty days past due or (iv) for
which terms have been renegotiated or compromised due to
32 0
the deteriorating financial condition of the obligor.
A qualification to the general prohibition has been
granted to commonly owned banks. The purchase of low quality assets by 80% owned sister banks or banks that are 80%
owned by a holding company is permissible, provided that the
318.
85,425
319.
320.

See OCC, Staff Interpretive Letter, [Current] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
(June 16, 1983).
12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(7).
Id. at § 371c(b)(10).
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purchase is consistent with safe and sound banking practice.32 1 Whether the purchase of a low quality asset is a safe
and sound banking practice is determined by the purchasing
bank's primary federal supervisor. Recent consultation with
the federal banking supervisors disclosed that no formal policy has been taken on this issue.
Section 371c sets forth another exception to low quality
asset prohibition unrelated to common ownership between
banks. This exception permits the purchase of low quality assets from an affiliate if the purchase is pursuant to an independent credit evaluation, committed to by the bank prior to
32 2
the time the asset is acquired by the affiliate.
The history of the exception is explanatory. In 1974, the
Board of Governors of the FRS issued a significant interpretation addressing the issue of whether a bank's purchase of a
note from a mortgage banking affiliate was an extension of
credit to an affiliate. The Board concluded that the purchase
of mortgage notes, or participations in mortgage notes, constituted a loan or extension of credit to the affiliate, subject to
the limitations of section 371c. However, there would be no
extension of credit to the affiliate if the bank's commitment to
purchase the loan or participation was obtained by the affiliate in anticipation of the affiliate's commitment to make the
loan, and the purchase was based upon the bank's independent evaluation of the creditworthiness of the mortgagor.3 23
The distinction between these two events is that the latter circumstance evidences taking advantage of an investment
opportunity by the bank. The former circumstance evidences
action taken under the improper incentive to alleviate working capital needs of the affiliate directly attributable to excessive outstanding commitments. This interpretation applies to
mortgage loans, promissory notes, bills of exchange, conditional sales contracts and similar paper. The principles of this
interpretation are now codified in section 371c and are made
explicitly applicable to low quality assets.
321. Id. at § 371c(a)(4) & (d)(1).
322. Id. at § 371c(a)(3).
323. Id. at § 371c(c)(4).
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5.

615

Collateral Requirements

The 1982 Banking Act also revises the collateral requirements for loans, extensions of credit, guarantees, acceptances
or letters of credit issued on behalf of an affiliate by a bank or
its subsidiaries. Collateral securing such transactions must
have a market value equal to: (i) 100% of the transaction if
the collateral consists of: U.S. obligations or U.S. guaranteed
obligations, instruments eligible for rediscount or purchase at
a Federal Reserve Bank or segregated, earmarked deposit accounts with the lending bank; 32 4 (ii) 110% of the amount 3of
2
the transaction if the collateral consists of state obligations; 5
(iii) 120% of the amount of the transaction if the collateral
consists of debt instruments, including receivables3 26 or (iv)
130% of the amount of the transaction if the collateral is
27
stock, leases, or other real or personal property.
The initial ratio between the transaction and the collateral must be maintained during the term of the transaction.32 8
As the outstanding balance of the transaction increases or decreases, the collateral must be adjusted. 2" The collateral must
be replaced entirely with other eligible collateral if the initial
collateral is retired or amortized.3 30
These collateral requirements do not apply to an acceptance secured by attached documents or by other property
having an ascertainable market value involved in the transaction. 33 1 Low quality assets or securities issued by an affiliate of
32
the lending bank are not acceptable as collateral.
6.

Quantitative Limitations

Section 371c limits the aggregate amount of "covered
transactions" between the bank and its subsidiaries and any
one affiliate to 10% of the bank's capital and surplus. It limits
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

Id. at §
Id. at §
Id. at §
Id. at §
Id. at §
Id.

371c(c)(1)(A).
371c(c)(1)(B).
371c(c)(1)(C).
371c(c)(1)(D).
371c(c)(2).

Id..
Id. at § 371c(c)(5).
Id. at § 371c(c)(3).
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covered transactions between a bank and all of its affiliates to
20% of the bank's capital and surplus. 333 The aggregate
amount of "covered transactions" is the amount of the covered transactions about to be engaged in, plus the amount of
all outstanding covered transactions. 34
7. Exempt Transactions
Transactions exempt from the limitations of section 371c
include: (i) making deposits in an affiliated bank in the ordinary course of correspondent business; 33 (ii) giving immediate

credit to an affiliate for uncollected items received in the ordinary course of business;3 36 (iii) making a loan or extension of
credit to, or issuing a guarantee, acceptance, or letter of credit
on behalf of, an affiliate that is secured by obligations of the
United States or a segregated, earmarked deposit with the national bank; 3 7 (iv) purchasing securities issued by any company of the kinds described in section 1843(c)(1) of Title
12;338 (v) purchasing assets having a readily identifiable and
publicly available market quotation and purchased at the
market quotation, or purchasing loans on a nonrecourse basis
from affiliated banks3 3 9 and (vi) purchasing from an affiliate a
loan or extension of credit that was originated by the national
bank and sold to the affiliate subject to a repurchase agree3 40
ment or with recourse.

VII.

OTHER FEDERAL BANKING LAW CONSIDERATIONS

A commercial loan may involve a number of special banking law considerations including anti-tying, securities credit,
loan participation, currency transaction reporting, bribery,
RICO and criminal concerns.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

§
§
§
§
§

371c(a)(1)(A).
371c(a)(1)(B).
371c(b)(8).
371c(d)(2).
371c(d)(3).
§3371c(d)(4).
§ 371c(d)(5).
§ 371c(d)(6).

"Reregulated" Banking Environment

1986]

A.

617

Bank Antitrust Law and Tying Arrangements

Federal statute prohibits national and state banks from
"tying" an extension of credit to the compliance of a bank
customer with the following conditions: (i) obtaining additional credit, property or service from the bank (other than a
loan, discount, deposit, or trust service); (ii) obtaining additional credit, property or service from a bank holding company or subsidiary of a bank holding company of the bank;
(iii) providing additional credit, property or service to the
bank other than those related to, and usually provided in connection with, a loan, discount, deposit or trust service; (iv)
providing additional credit, property, or services to a bank
holding company or subsidiary of a bank holding company of
the bank or (v) prohibiting the customer from obtaining other
credit, property, or service from a competitor, or a holding
company or subsidiary of a bank holding company of the competitor other than requirements reasonably imposed in a
41
credit transaction to assure the soundness of the credit.
One state supreme court has held that, unless anticompetitive effects can be shown, a bank did not violate prohibitions
against tying arrangements by requiring a third party to
provide a mortgage on a previously unsecured loan before the
bank extends credit to another (affiliated) party. 2 The requirement that franchisees deposit receipts in a franchisor's
name at a franchisor approved bank does not constitute an
illegal tying arrangement since the deposits were not products
tied to the purchase of the franchise. 343 Also, requiring a borrower to obtain related loan service from a list of third parties
3 44
approved by the lender is not an anti-tying violation.
A non-customer of the bank does not necessarily lack
standing under the bank tying statutes, although problems of
lack of standing for "remoteness" may arise. 4 5 The 1982
Banking Act applies anti-tying restrictions to federal S&Ls in
a manner similar to the above anti-tying provisions applicable
341. Id. at § 1972(1).
342. See Continental Bank v. Barklay Riding Academy, Inc., 93 N.J. 153, 459
A.2d 1163 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 994 (1983).
343. See Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 689 F.2d 242 (11th Cir. 1982).
344. See Bender v. Southland Corp., 749 F.2d 1205 (6th Cir. 1984).
345. See Campbell v. Wells Fargo Bank, 781 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1986).
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to banks and bank holding companies under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended. 4 6
B.

Securities (Margin) Credit and Federal Reserve Board
Regulation U (including "Junk Bond" Regulation)

FRB Regulation U, promulgated under the Federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a 1" restricts the amount of
"margin stock" secured credit that a bank may extend for the
purpose of purchasing or carrying margin stock to a specific
percentage (50% ). 34 8 On July 27, 1983, the FRB promulgated
substantially revised and simplified margin rules under Regulation U, 349 and technical amendments thereto.3 50 The FRB
351
has published a comparison chart on Regulation U.
A bank need not file a Form U-1 simply because a credit
is directly or indirectly secured by any stock. A bank now
must file this form and comply with the margin stock
percentage requirement, as related to the value of such collateral, only where the credit is directly or indirectly secured by
margin stock.325 The revised regulation now applies to both
member and nonmember FRS banks that extend credit for
the purpose of purchasing or arranging securities, but (as
before) not to S&Ls and credit unions. 53 There appears to be
3 54
no private right of action under Regulation U.
Margin stock for purposes of Regulation U includes:
(1) Any equity security registered or having unlisted trading
privileges on a national securities exchange;
(2) any OTC margin stock;
346. Cf. McGee v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 761 F.2d 647 (11th Cir. 1985).
347. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c, 78g, 78h & 78w (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
348. See id. at § 78 g; 12 C.F.R. § 221 (1986).
349. 12 C.F.R. § 221.3(a).
350. FRS, Complete Revision and Simplification of Regulation U, 48 Fed. Reg.
35,074 (1983).
351. FRS, Final Rule Correction of Regulation U, 48 Fed. Reg. 37,361 (1983).
352. FRS, Comparison Chart of Old and New Regulation U Section, 48 Fed. Reg.
48,797 (1983).
353. 12 C.F.R. §§ 221.3(a), (c) & 221.4.
354. Id. at § 221.2(b).
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(3) any OTC security designated as qualified for trading in
the National Market System under a designation plan approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission (NMS
security).
(4) any debt security convertible into a margin stock or carrying a warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase a margin
stock;
(5) any warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase a margin
stock; or
(6) any security issued by an investment company registered
under Section 8 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15
U.S.C. 80a-8), other than:
(i) a company licensed under the Small Business Investment Company Act of 1958, as amended (15
U.S.C. 661); or
(ii) a company which has at least 95 percent of its
assets continuously invested in exempted securities
355

Regulation U is particularly important where the purpose of
the commercial loan is to finance an acquisition involving
margin stock, or where the restrictive nature of covenants
contained in the commercial loan agreement effectively make
the loan "indirectly secured" by margin stock. 5 e
On January 8, 1986, and in response to the rash of hostile
takeovers financed by "junk bonds," a divided FRB adopted
an interpretative ruling to its Regulation G (a margin rule
similar to Regulation U but applying to lenders other than
banks and broker-dealers). This ruling concludes that debt securities issued by a shell corporation with no assets of its own,
for the purpose of acquiring stock in a large entity, are considered "indirectly secured" by "margin" stock. As such these securities would be subject to the 50% margin limitations, subject to three exclusions: (i) operating companies with
substantial assets or cash flow; (ii) guarantees of borrowing by
355. Id. at § 221.2(h)(1)-(6); Bassler v. Central Nat'l Bank, 715 F.2d 308 (7th Cir.
1983).
356. See 12 C.F.R. § 221.3(a)(1), as amended by FRS, Amendments to Regulations G, T and U, 49 Fed. Reg. 35,756 (1984). For a recent FRB listing of margin
stock, see FRS, Securities Credit Transactions, 50 Fed. Reg. 30,931 (1985).
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companies with substantial assets or cash flow agreed-upon
mergers and (iii) statutory "short-form" mergers where the
acquiring party already has a substantial ownership interest
in the target. 51
C. Loan Participations
In addition to lending limit and securities law implications respecting loan participations, it is also worth noting for
this present topic the Comptroller's recent position on loan
participations. Inspired by the substantial problems of Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company, the Comptroller has revised its policies concerning loan participation,
whereby in part a purchasing bank is required to perform its
own independent credit analysis. This policy also encourages
written lending policies and procedures by banks, agreement
by the borrower to provide full credit information to the bank
making the loan, agreement by the selling bank to provide full
credit information to the purchasing bank and written documentation of any recourse arrangements, setting forth the
3 8
rights and obligations of each party. 5
D. Limitations on Standby Letter of Credit
Traditionally, letters of credit are indispensable instruments in international commercial transactions, serving as a
finance and payment mechanism in the sale of goods. In recent years, the letter of credit, in the form of the standby letter of credit (SLC) has served a different function, by directing the issuer to pay the beneficiary not in the event of
performance but upon the customer's default or nonperformance. The SLC provides security for the customer's performance, with no one initially expecting the beneficiary to draw
357. See FRB, Final Interpretative Rule on Regulation G, 51 Fed. Reg. 1,771
(1986).
358. On loan participations generally, see, e.g., Ledwidge, Loan Participations
Among Commercial Banks, 51 TENN L. REv. 519 (1984); Rogers, Intercreditor Provisions and Arrangements, in Norton-CLG, supra note 3, at ch. 14.
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upon the credit, although legally the SLC is an absolute obligation of the issuing bank. As such, the SLC has functional
attributes of both an unsecured loan and a guaranty.3 5 9
The state, federal, contractual and international legal implications of the SLC are outside the scope of this article.
However, it should be noted here that with respect to national
banks the Comptroller provides:
A national bank may issue letters of credit permissible
under the Uniform Commercial Code or the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits to or on behalf
of its customers. As a matter of sound banking practice, letters of credit should be issued in conformity with the following: (a) each letter of credit should conspicuously state that
it is a letter of credit or be conspicuously entitled as such;
(b) the bank's undertaking should contain a specified expiration date or be for a definite term; (c) the bank's undertaking should be limited in amount; (d) the bank's obligation to pay should arise only upon the presentation of a
draft or other documents as specified in the letter of credit,
and the bank must not be called upon to determine questions of fact or law at issue between the account party and
the beneficiary; (e) the bank's customer should have an unqualified obligation to reimburse the bank for payments
made under the letter of credit. 360
The Comptroller has taken the position that this ruling
applies to "commercial" letters of credit and not to SLCs.
While setting no formal standards for SLCs, the Comptroller
has ruled that for purposes of the lending limit rule of 12
U.S.C. § 84, SLCs are included, except if:
prior to or at the time of issuance, the issuing bank is paid
an amount equal to the bank's maximum liability under the
standby letter of credit; or
prior to or at the time of issuance, the issuing bank has set
aside sufficient funds in a segregated deposit account, clearly
ear-marked for that purpose, to cover the bank's maximum
liability under the standby letter of credit; or
359. OCC Banking Circular (Aug. 2, 1984), replacing Banking Circular No. 181
(Dec. 8, 1983).
360. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7016 (1986). The Comptroller has recently denied waiver of 12
C.F.R. § 7.7016(e) respecting use of an SLC for, or in connection with a bank's proposed political risk insurance program (Counsel Opinion No. 295, July 3, 1984).
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the Comptroller of the Currency has found that a particular
standby letter of credit will not expose the issuer to the sim" '
ilar risk of loss as would a loan to the account party.36
This ruling arose because of a major bank failure in 1973. The
FRB 312 and the FDIC3 6 3 adopted comparable rules.
A long-standing legal issue is whether the SLC can be
characterized as a "guaranty," in which case the issuance
would be an ultra vires act of a national bank. In this respect,
the lines of definition are often blurred. However, the Comptroller implicitly recognizes the authority of a national bank
36 4
to issue SLCs.
In a private opinion letter by then Comptroller Chief
Counsel Brian Smith (dated July 28, 1983), it was concluded
that a bank (assuming it has made an independent and prior
credit evaluation) may issue standby letters of credit on behalf of third party borrowers of the bank's parent holding
company. The holding company is designated as the beneficiary of the letter of credit.
It should be noted that a bank's issuance of letters of
credit is subject to the antiboycott provisions of the Export
Administration Act, discussed. Failure to comply with these
restrictions may result in substantial liability for a bank.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
recently held, and was subsequently reversed by the Supreme
Court, 36 5 that standby letters of credit are deposits for FDIC
insurance purposes, based on interpretation of FDIC Act definitions.3 6 6 If this were finally ruled to be the case, then FDIC
insurance premiums would be attributable to SLCs, thus affecting their pricing. However, as mentioned, the Supreme
Court has overturned the circuit court.
361. For further discussion of letter of credit, see, e.g., Rendell, Standby Letter
of Credit, in Norton-CLG, supra note 3, at ch. 20.
362. 12 C.F.R. § 7.1160 (1984).
363. Id. at § 208.3.
364. Id. at § 337.2 (1986).
365. See Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. FDIC, 751 F.2d 1131 (10th Cir. 1984), rev'd,
106 S. Ct. 1931 (1986).
366. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.1160 (1984).
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Bank Secrecy Act

The Bank Secrecy Act, enacted in 1970, requires financial
institutions, federally insured banks and savings and loan associations, to maintain certain records and submit reports to
the federal government to assist the federal government in 36
its7
investigation of income tax evasion and criminal activity.
The act requires or authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury
to promulgate various types of reporting or recording regulations. The Secretary must require a United States citizen, resident or person present in the United States to record or report relationships with foreign financial agencies.' 8 The
Secretary may promulgate regulations pertaining to "persons
who transport currency or monetary instruments between the
United States and a foreign country in an amount greater
than $5,000;119 domestic and foreign currency or monetary instruments;3 70 and reproduction of instruments drawn on a fi''3 1
nancial institution and the identity of account holder. 7
Bank record keeping instruments basically fall within two
categories. Account holder records mandate identification of
account holders, with limited exceptions, by means of taxpayer identification numbers. The second category of records
constitutes reproduction of checks, drafts or money orders
372
drawn on a financial institution or issued and payable by it.
Other records in this category include a wide variety of documents, the most important of which focus on items in excess
of $10,000 and loan documents. 3
The Secretary of the Treasury may impose civil money
penalties for violation of the act or may cause unreported im37 4
ported or exported monetary instruments to be forfeited.
The Secretary may enjoin parties for noncompliance through
367. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (principally codified at 12 U.S.C.
1951) (constitutionality upheld in California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21
(1974)).
368. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5322 (1982).
369. 32 U.S.C. § 1101 (1982).
370. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1053 & 1081.
371. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1289b & 1953 (1982).
372. 31 C.F.R. § 103.34 (1986).
373. Id. at §§ 103.34 & .36. See also United States v. Thompson, 603 F.2d 1200
(5th Cir. 1979).
374. 12 U.S.C. § 1955.

§
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the court of appropriate jurisdiction or may bring suit for
criminal penalties. 37 5 The Secretary may delegate enforcement
of the act to a financial institution's primary bank regulator
which may employ its administrative remedies to enforce the
37 6
act.
F.

Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984

The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 creates a
revised bank bribery statute. 7 The statute makes it a felony
for a person associated with a financial institution, including a
bank, savings and loan association or credit union or a holding
company thereof, to accept anything of value from any person
or entity in connection with any transaction or business related to the financial institution or holding company of which
he is associated. Transactions include not only loan transactions but any transaction related to financial institution business. The statute prohibits any person from directly or indirectly giving, offering or promising anything of value to an
official of a financial institution or a holding company in connection with any business of the financial institution: This
provision covers the payer as well as the receiver of any bribe.
1. Elements
There are three basic elements of the bribery offense proscribed by this statute: (i) an act of soliciting or receiving a
thing of value by an officer or employee of a financial institution or holding company for himself or a third party, (ii) done
knowingly and willfully and (iii) with knowledge by the officer
or employee that the act of soliciting or receiving was for or in
connection with a transaction or business of a financial institution. These elements must be proved relative to a bribe received by a bank officer or employee. 8
To an individual offerer or payer under this statute, the
elements are: (i) an act of offering or giving a thing of value to
an officer or employee of a financial institution or holding
375.
376.
377.
378.

Id. at §§ 1954, 1956 & 1957.
Id. at § 1958.
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837; 18 U.S.C. § 215 (Supp. III 1985).
18 U.S.C. § 215(a).
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company or its holding company for the benefit of either the
officer or employee himself or a third party, (ii) an act of offering or giving done knowingly and willfully and (iii) knowledge that the act of offering or giving was for or in connection
379
with a transaction or business of a financial institution.
2.

Penalties

If the item offered or given is greater than $100 in value,
the offense is a felony punishable by up to five years imprisonment and/or a fine of $5,000, or three times the value of the
bribe or gratuity, whichever is greater. If the thing of value is
$100 or less, the offense is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment of up to one year and/or a fine of $1,000. A higher
fine, however, may be imposed for offenses committed after
December 31, 1984.380 Under the act, an individual may be
fined up to $250,000 for a felony and up to $100,000 for a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment up to six months. A
corporation may be fined up to $500,000 for felony and up to
$100,000 for a misdemeanor.3 8 1
The bank regulatory agencies are considering whether to
issue a regulation relative to codes of conduct through their
regulatory powers regarding unsafe or unsound banking practices. 38 2 The United States Department of Justice has also
issued its policy respecting enforcement of the act.38 3
G.

RICO Civil Actions

Responding to the view that organized crime was a powerful threat to American industry, Congress in 1970 passed
the Organized Crime Control Act.384 Section 1962 is the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Statute, commonly
referred to as "RICO". 38 5 RICO prohibits the following: (i) if a
business or person receives income from a "pattern of
379. Id. at § 215(b).
380. See id. at § 3623 (Supp. III 1985).
381. Id.

382. See, e.g., OCC, Banking Circular - 188 (Jan. 16, 1985) and Supplement 1,
(July 10, 1985).
383. For copy of text, see 45 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 15 (1985).
384. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 941.
385. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982).
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racketeering activity" or from a collection of an unlawful debt,
it is illegal to use this money, directly or indirectly, to operate
or acquire an interest in any "enterprise," (ii) a "pattern of
racketeering activity" or a collection on an unlawful debt cannot be used to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, an
interest or control in any enterprise, (iii) a person who is employed in any enterprise cannot conduct or participate in the
conduct of that enterprise's affairs through a "pattern of
racketeering activity" or collection of an unlawful debt, (iv) no
person can conspire to do any of the above prohibited activities.38 6 The embrace of these prohibitions may result in a
criminal or civil action and may go well beyond the realm of
organized crime and into the traditional business and com3 87
mercial world.
A "pattern of racketeering activity," as defined by RICO,
requires at least two acts of racketeering activity within ten
years of one another.3 8 8 "Racketeering activity" includes any
act or threat of murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery,
bribery, extortion or dealing in dangerous drugs, chargeable
under state law and punishable by more than one-year imprisonment 89 Even more significantly for financial institutions,
"racketeering activity" also includes many other specific acts
such as counterfeiting, embezzlement, mail fraud, wire fraud
and fraud in the sale of securities. 390
It is important to note that it appears the two offenses
necessary to establish the pattern need not be related. For instance, an individual or business could engage in a "pattern of
racketeering" by a fraudulent sale of securities in 1976 and
mail fraud in 1985. Most jurisdictions have held that, although the predicate criminal acts must be connected to the
enterprise, they need not be related to each other. 91 Also, two
repetitive acts in the same scheme, such as two sales of securities in one fraudulent security scheme, have been held by
386. Id.

387. See, e.g., Kaufman & Levin, Civil RICO Litigation Involving Banks: The
Developing Case Law, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1984).
388. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982).
389. Id. at § 1961(1).
390. Id.
391. See, e.g., United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980).
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many of the circuit courts to constitute a "pattern of racketeering activity" even if they occur on the same day. While a
"pattern of activity" and a nexus with the defendant and the
"enterprise" must be shown, it is not necessary to prove the
defendant actually participated in the operation or management of the RICO "enterprise."
The United States Supreme Court has resolved a conflict
between the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second
and Seventh Circuits regarding certain restrictive standing requirements under RICO inferred by the Second Circuit.392
The Supreme Court has overruled the Second Circuit by holding that it was not necessary in a RICO civil action that the
plaintiff show the injury was caused by an activity RICO was
designed to deter and not simply by the "predicate acts" or
that the two "predicate acts" had to consist of actual prior
criminal convictions against the RICO defendant before the
bringing of the civil RICO action.39 3 The effect of the Supreme Court's decision will be to broaden civil access to RICO
and to leave to Congress any future limitations on RICO's
39 4
availability.
Federal prosecutors almost routinely add RICO counts to
indictments in business crime cases. The FDIC is now also
using RICO in certain of its bank failure cases. 9
Congress has provided criminal sanctions under RICO
and for civil action.3 9 6 More importantly, the statute provides
a private right of action for any person injured in his business
or property because of a RICO violation. 9 7 Most significant to
the private litigant is the authorization of treble damages,
398
plus costs and reasonable attorney's fees.
392. Cf. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), with Haroco,
Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984).
393. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985); see also American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985).
394. See Greenberg, RICO: Status of the Law After Sedima, in 3 EMERGING
THEORIES OF LENDER LIABILITY

(Chaitman ed. 1985).

395. See FDIC Sues Under Rico, Securities Acts for Brokering Scheme in Bank
Failure, 44 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 653 (Apr. 15, 1985).
396. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982).
397. Id. at § 1964.
398. Id.
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RICO concerns involving financial institutions have
arisen recently regarding various "prime rate" litigation, stock
fraud, mail fraud, antitrust violations and financing retail
purchases of mobile homes. A bank can be sued under RICO
for wrongful conversion of funds in an IRA to satisfy an account holder's obligation under a loan guaranty. Even professionals representing banks can be sued under RICO, for example, an accountant who assisted in the preparation and
dissemination of false bank financial statements.39 9 Conceivably, RICO may become used, if the fact situations permit, by
private litigants and the bank regulators to address serious
cases of bank fraud or mismanagement and (by the bank regulators) for willful (for example criminal) violations of the
banking laws.
H.

Criminal Laws and False Statements

Generally, false statements, including a forged letter of
credit, made to a federally insured banking institution can
give rise to criminal liability if made to influence an institution's action "upon any application, advance, discount,
purchase, purchase agreement, repurchase agreement, commitment, or loan."4 00
VII.

INTERNATIONAL LOAN CONSIDERATIONS

International loan related activities by United States
banking institutions may be subject to statutorily prescribed
supervision by the appropriate federal banking agency, to disclose regulation by the SEC, to federal anti-boycott legislation, and to foreign currency transaction reporting.
A.

InternationalLending Supervision Act of 1983

Beginning in the 1970's United States banks increased
their foreign lending activities without the benefit of a statutorily comprehensive regulatory or supervisory scheme. The
399. See Kaufman & Levin, supra note 384; Greenberg, supra note 391; and
Comment, Civil RICO Actions in Commercial Litigation: Rackateer or Businessman?, 36 Sw L.J. 925 (1982).
400. See 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1982).
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International Lending Supervision Act of 1983 (ILSA)' 0 ' was
enacted to address this situation and to "assure that the economic health and stability of the United States and the other
nations of the world shall not be adversely affected or
threatened in the future by imprudent lending practices or inadequate supervision" and achieve "the adoption of effective
and consistent supervisory policies and practices with respect
to international lending."40 ' ILSA applies to members of the
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC),
40 3
including the FDIC, the Comptroller and the FRS.
The federal banking agencies must evaluate foreign coun40
try exposure and transfer risk within banking institutions. 4
These factors must be taken into account when evaluating the
capital adequacy of a banking institution.0 5 The agencies began implementation of ILSA by issuing an interagency policy
40 6
statement on the examination of international loans.
ILSA requires a banking institution to establish and to
maintain a special reserve if, in the judgment of the appropriate federal banking agency:
(A) the quality of such banking institution's assets has been
impaired by a protracted inability of foreign public or private borrowers in a foreign country to make payments on
their external indebtedness as indicated by such factors,
among others, as (i) a failure by such public or private borrowers to
make full interest payments on external
indebtedness;
(ii) a failure to comply with the terms of any
restructured indebtedness; or
(iii) a failure by the foreign country to comply with
an International Monetary Fund or other adjustment program; or
401. Act of Nov. 30, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-191, 97 Stat. 1278 (codified at 12
U.S.C. §§ 3901-3912 (Supp. I1 1985)).
402. 12 U.S.C. § 3901(a)(1) & (b) (Supp. III 1985).
403. Id. at § 3902.
404. Id. at § 3903.
405. See supra notes 95-132 and accompanying text.
406. Joint News Release Comptroller of the Currency, FDIC, FRS, December 15,
1983.
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(B) no definite
prospects exist for the orderly restoration of
40 7
debt service.
The special reserve must not be considered part of capital
and surplus or allowances for possible loan losses. 0 8 The special reserve must be charged against current income and deducted from loss loans.4 0 9 The banking institution has the option of charging-off all or a portion of the international
loan. 1 0
The appropriate federal banking agency must analyze the
results of foreign loan rescheduling negotiations, assess the
loan loss risk, and ensure that capital and reserve positions of
United States banking institutions are adequate to accommodate potential losses in the foreign loans.4 '
A banking institution can charge no more than the administrative cost of restructuring an international loan, unless
the fee is amortized over the term of the loan."4 2 The appropriate federal banking agencies have promulgated regulations
addressing the restriction on fees and the accounting treatment for fees related to the restructuring of international
loans." 3
A banking institution with foreign country exposure must
submit quarterly information regarding the exposure to the
appropriate federal banking agency. 4" 4 It must also publicly
disclose foreign country exposure in relationship to assets and
capital.'
The appropriate federal banking agency must require
that a banking institution maintain adequate capital by establishing minimum capital levels." 6 Failure to maintain adequate capital may be deemed an unsafe or unsound banking
407. 12 U.S.C. § 3904(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 20.1 -.8
(OCC); § 211.41 -.43 (FRS); 351.1-.3 (FDIC) (1986)).
408. 12 U.S.C. § 3904(b)(a)(2) (1986).
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id. at § 3904(b).
412. Id. at § 3905(a).
413. 12 C.F.R. § 20.9 (OCC); § 211.45 (FRS); § 351.2 (FDIC) (1986).
414. 12 U.S.C. § 3906(a) (Supp. III 1985) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 20.10 (OCC); §
211.44 (FRS); § 351.2 (FDIC) (1986)).
415. 12 U.S.C. 3906(b) (Supp. Ill 1985).
416. 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (1982).
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practice. 4 17 If a banking institution fails to maintain capital at
or above its required level, the appropriate federal banking
agency may issue a directive that requires the banking institution to adhere to a plan by which it shall achieve its required
capital level. 4 8 This directive and plan is enforceable in the
same manner as a cease-and-desist order.4 The appropriate
federal banking institution may consider the progress of a
banking institution in adhering to a plan whenever the banking institution, an affiliate or the holding company that controls the institution seeks the approval of the appropriate federal banking agency for a proposal that would divert earnings,
diminish capital or otherwise impede the progress of the
banking institution in achieving its minimum capital level.2 0
If one or more banking institutions extend credit aggregating more than $20 million to finance certain types of mining or metal related projects in a foreign country, written economic feasibility evaluation of the project must be prepared
and approved in writing by a senior official of the banking institution prior to the extension of credit. 42 ' The evaluation
must consider several factors, including whether the credit
can reasonably be expected to be paid from revenues gener2 2
ated by the prospect without regard to government subsidy.
These evaluations shall be reviewed by the appropriate
federal banking agency when conducting an examination of
or claim
the banking institution. 42 3 No private right of action
42 4
requirement.
this
upon
based
be
may
relief
for
ILSA supplements, and does not detract from, agency
powers under other laws which may be used to ensure compliance with ILSA, its regulations or orders. A banking institution and an officer, director, employee, agent or other person
"participating in the conduct of the affairs" of the banking
institution are subject to a civil penalty of $1,000 per day for
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.

Id.
Id.

Id.
12 U.S.C. § 3907 (1982).
Id. at § 3908.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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The General Accounting

Office audits the banking agencies concerning their interna2
tional regulation, supervision and examination activities. 1
B.

SEC Disclosure Requirements

Bank holding companies registered with the SEC and engaged in lending to countries experiencing liquidity problems
caused by economic and political conditions are required to
make certain disclosures regarding these borrowers. 2 7 Information regarding these situations is material to investors to
assist them in making judgments about international lending
activities that involve more than the normal credit risks.4 2 8 In
order to provide investors with appropriate information, the
SEC has issued disclosure guidelines for bank holding companies participating in lending arrangements with countries experiencing liquidity problems. 29 These include the following
minimal disclosures:
If conditions in a country may have a material impact on the
payment of the country's public or private sector debt, and
if the "outstandings" (loans, acceptances, interest bearing
deposits with other banks and other investments) of the
country that are payable to the bank holding company's total consolidated "outstandings," the country should be
identified.
The amount of "outstandings" to identified countries should
be stated in dollars, as a percentage of total amounts, or in a
similar manner that indicates the magnitude of the "outstandings" to the identified countries. While the amount of
"outstandings" may be aggregated, if the aggregate amount
disclosed is concentrated in a particular country, the amount
related to that country should be separately disclosed.
An indication of the effect that these conditions have had or
are expected to have on the financial conditions or results or
operations 0 of the bank holding company should be
provided.

43

425. 12 U.S.C. § 3909 (Supp. III 1985).

426. Id. at § 3910.
427. SEC, Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 49, 47 Fed. Reg. 49,627 (1982).
428. Id.

429. Id.
430. Id.
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The following information may be provided as an alternative to the above disclosures:
Identify each country in which the total public and private
sector "outstandings" payable to the bank holding company
exceed one percent of the company's total consolidated
outstandings.
State the amount of "outstandings" to each identified country, as a percentage of total amounts, or in the similar manner that indicate the magnitude of the outstandings related
to the identified country.
Discuss the impact if the "outstandings" to any of the identified countries have had or are expected to have a material
adverse impact upon the registrant's financial condition or
results of operations."31
Bank holding companies provide current information at
the time of periodic SEC filings or when material subsequent
developments necessitate disclosure. 43 An example of a mate-

rial subsequent development is the negotiation or agreement
to restructure existing debt and to obtain additional borrowings, between a foreign country and a U.S. lender, other foreign banks or international lending agencies.4 33 The disclo-

sures include:
(1) the nature of the negotiations and a general description
of the agreements;
(2) the impact on maturities of existing debt principal and
on unpaid interest;
(3) any commitments of the registrant to extend additional
borrowings to a foreign country; and
(4) any other arrangements, such as an agreement to main434
tain deposits in a foreign country with government banks.
Another example of a material development is the situation in which the central bank of a foreign government
purchases the obligations for past due interest payments of
certain private sector borrowers who otherwise had the ability
to make the required interest payments on dollar denominated loans but were unable to exchange local currency for
431.
432.
433.
434.

Id.
SEC, Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 49A, 48 Fed. Reg. 3,585 (1983).
Id.
Id.
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the United States dollars.4 35 This enables the creditworthy
private sector borrowers to comply with the terms of the loan
agreements as to interest payments.43 6
The following minimum disclosures are appropriate when
the total loans by the bank holding company private sector
borrowers in a foreign country are material in relation to the
total of all loans by the registrant to that country:
(1) A description of the private sector payment mechanism;
(2) The amount of loans outstanding to private sector borrowers in the foreign country for which interest payments
have been made under the payment mechanism, and the
status of the principal payments due; and
(3) The amount of interest accrued on loans to private sector borrowers in the most recent fiscal year and interim period that has not been remitted in dollars to the U.S. bank.
This disclosure may be excluded if the total interest and
fees recognized on these loans during the most recent fiscal
year are de minimus in relation to the total interest and fees
4
recognized on foreign loans. 31

C. Foreign Currency Transaction Reporting
The Federal Currency and Foreign Transaction Reporting
Act requires that transactions involving United States -monetary instruments in excess of $10,000 between United States
and foreign financial institutions be reported to the government pursuant to prescribed reporting procedures and
forms. 38 Failure to comply with this act may result in civil4 39
and criminal liabilities, 440 and injunctive action by the government. 44 1 More specifically, on July 5, 1985, the United States
Treasury Department issued final rules requiring certain
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See 31 U.S.C. §§ 321, 5311-14, 5316-22 (1982).
Id. at § 5321.
Id. at § 5322.
Id. at § 5320.
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United States financial institutions specified by the regulations to report financial transactions with foreign financial
442
agencies.

IX.

LIMITATIONS ON ALTERNATIVE FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS

Although without the scope of this article, the subject of
alternative financing arrangements needs to be mentioned in
the context of any present day discussion of commercial lending activities of banking institutions. Many banks, particularly the larger banking institutions, are evaluating whether
they wish to continue on any large scale in the traditional
commercial lending business. The reason for this reevaluation
is two-fold: on the one hand, large corporate customers of
these institutions are seeking alternative commercial financing
arrangements through the commercial paper markets and securities and bond markets; while, on the other hand, commercial lending is becoming a more high-risk, low-return, middlemarket phenomenon. Thus, to satisfy corporate clients and
otherwise to increase institutional revenues and profits with a
reduction of risk, many banking institutions are seeking alternative financing arrangements.4 4 3 Such arrangements can include: (i) lending of the institution's credit to a transaction by
way of a standby letter of credit, guaranty or other institutional support facility;444 (ii) provision of investment banking-

442. For final rules see Office of the Secretary, Treasury, Amendments to Implementing Regulations Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, 50 Fed. Reg.
42,691 (1985).
443. See opening remarks of Dr. Alan Coleman, President of Southwestern Graduate School of Banking at opening of Second Annual Institute on Fundamentals of
Commercial Lending (SMU School of Law 1986). However, note the paradox that last
year smaller and middle-sized banks have seen a significant increase in commercial
lending [see "Banks are Swimming in Loans," Am. Banker, March 4, 1986, at 28, col.
2] and thrift institutions are seeing a dramatic increase in this type of lending [see
"Thrifts Surge Ahead in Commercial Lending," Am. Banker, March 10, 1986, at 34,
col. 2].
444. See Boulder, Yield Enhancement Techniques for Banks, in NORTON-CLG,
supra note 3, at ch. 27.
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type services such as public and private placement of commercial paper and other private placement or underwriting related activities; ' 5 and (iii) actual direct involvement in certain lending situations through sale-leaseback, joint venture
and profit participation arrangements."4" The future of these
possible activities is, however, surrounded by a host of legal
considerations and impediments.
A.

Restrictions on Activities

Restrictions on alternative financing arrangements can include: (i) statutory and regulatory limitations on the issuance
of a guaranty by a banking institution,4 47 (ii) regulatory restrictions on the issuances of standby letters of credit, " 8 (iii)
Glass Steagall Act restrictions on a bank's investment banking
type activities,4 4 9 (iv) limitations on the type of investments a
banking institution can acquire,'450 (v) limitations on a banking institution's ownership of real estate4 51 and (vi) limitations
on a banking institution's being a joint venture or general
partner. 5 2
B. Restrictions on Vehicles
Even though a banking institution may not be prohibited
by certain statutory or regulatory barriers such as the Glass
Steagall Act, the institution cannot assume that it has express
or incidental powers to engage in such activities. Here the
bank regulators still control the lever, not only in terms of
permitting the activity but also in terms of the structural implementation of the activity, whether through the bank or
S&L directly or indirectly through a subsidiary of the bank or
445. See Norton, Up Against "The Wall": Glass-Steagalland the Dilemma of a
Deregulated ("Reregulated") Banking Environment, accepted for publication in February 1987 Bus. LAW.
446. See Snakard, Alternative Commercial Real Estate Financing Arrangements, in NORTON-CLG, supra note 3, at ch. 32.
447. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 7.7010 (1986).
448. See supra notes 359-66 and accompanying text.
449. See supra text accompanying note 24; Norton, Up Against "The Wall",
supra note 445.
450. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 1 (1986).
451. See Snakard, supra note 446, at § 32.06.
452. Id. at § 32.05.
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S&L or through a non-bank or non-S&L holding company
subsidiary.
An example of this structural dilemma has been the debate among the regulators and in Congress as how to expand
the securities and other powers of banks. The Treasury Department and the FRB, would like to see any such expansion
through separate non-bank subsidiaries of holding companies.
This vehicle is thought to be more identifiable for regulatory
purposes and to isolate, to some degree, the bank from liability or loss exposure.4 53 The Comptroller, at times, has indicated such an approach may be form over substance and appears not so much concerned by direct bank involvement, or
by bank subsidiary involvement, and selected securities activities, provided adequate regulatory safeguards are effective.4 54
The FDIC approach is: to permit state, non-FRS member
banks to engage in securities activities through "bona fide securities subsidiaries" with separate and distinct accounts,
records and management; to prohibit using a common name
or logo with the bank; to require adequate capital, as reviewed
by the FDIC on a case by case basis; to restricting lending
between a bank and securities subsidiaries; and to limit securities that can be underwritten (for example "investment quality" equity and debt securities). 455 Although the FHLBB
views the Glass Steagall Act as inapplicable to thrift institutions to exercise powers in the securities area, such powers
have been granted for limited activities, normally to be conducted through a separate service corporation subsidiary.4 5

453. See, e.g., comments of Treasury Undersecretary for Finance, George Gould,
as reported in Bank Regulators Call for Glass-SteagallRevisions and New Bank Securities Powers 46 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 652 (April 28, 1986).
454. See supra note 123.
455. See FDIC, Unsafe and Unsound Banking Practices, 49 Fed. Reg. 46,709
(1984); FDIC, Glass-Steagall Act; Applicability Policy Statement Regarding Securities Activities of Subsidiaries of Insured Non-member Banks, 47 Fed. Reg. 38,984
(1982) and 12 C.F.R. 337 (1986).
456. See 12 C.F.R. § 545.82.
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS: RISING IMPORTANCE OF

Ex-

AMINATION AND SUPERVISORY FUNCTIONS OF BANK REGULATORS

There are practical lessons to be learned from the exis-

tence of this complex scheme of bank regulation of lending
activities. First, is the overall appreciation of the fact that, in
addition to the "normal" type of commercial law problems entailed in commercial lending, the regulated framework within
which banking institutions operate give rise to sundry "peculiarized" legal concerns under federal banking regulation. Second, in any effective underwriting of a commercial loan transaction by a banking institution, these types of legal concerns
must "filter" into the overall underwriting process. But, third
and more importantly, on a broader institutional level, bank
officers and their counsel must be sensitive to the present regulatory environment, which is effectively one of "reregulation"
and not "deregulation." New business opportunities have
been made for banking institutions and, most probably, further expanded opportunity will come. However, from a countervailing perspective, the bank regulators have recently been
reassessing their approach to the basic banking objective of
safety and soundness.
What must be understood concerning this new regulatory
focus on safety and soundness is that such reevaluation, and
for that matter, much of bank "reregulation" today, is occurring in large part through the examination and supervisory
functions of the regulators. 457 When considering the types of

assessments being made; (i) on the ratings of banking institutions under the CAMEL system, (ii) on the classification and
"scheduling" of assets generally, (iii) on the provisions for adequate loan loss reserves, (iv) on the proposed risk-based capi8
tal requirements, (v) on the assessment of real estate assets" 5
and (vi) on the general intensification and broadening of FRB
examination and supervision of bank holding company units,
the most significant impact that this often subjective and ad
hoc world of examination and supervision can have on
457. See, e.g., Regulators Focus on Deregulation, Increased Supervision of Industry, 46 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 795 (May 12, 1986).
458. See Whitley, Real Estate Regulations Affecting Banking Institutions and
Other Commercial Lenders, in NORTON-CLG, supra note 3, at § 33.10.
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"Reregulated" Banking Environment

banking institutions generally and on their lending functions
specifically becomes apparent.
In the present environment, the bank regulators, as examiners and supervisors, are highly concerned about such
matters as:
Excessive competition in a deregulated market, which has
caused more bankers to undertake a follow-the-leader type
of analysis rather than exploring a market niche;
Liberalized credit standards by banks, without a corresponding re-adjustment of internal safeguards to monitor
borrowers accepted under the liberalized standards;
Bankers' education, which has not kept up with changes in
various industries. For example, major industries experiencing change presently include high technology, airline and agriculture. There are many old loan agreements still in place
in relationship to these rapidly changing industries and new
loan agreements that were clearly structured by individuals
who did not understand the new rules related to these
industries;
Difficulties experienced by collateral lenders. A collateral
lender is a banking institution that does not rely on the cash
flow of the borrower to service the debt. Rather, it relies on
the valuation of the underlying collateral to value the debt.
These types of lenders have suffered particularly in the industries of agriculture, oil and gas, real estate and computer
production (where obsolescence is a major concern with
backlogged inventory);
Speculation, especially in the area of real estate construction
and high tech. Bankers make loans with a percentage of the
"deal" hoping that the industry will improve or mature prior
to loan repayment;
Continued abuses of insider, affiliate and correspondent
transactions;
Excessive concentrations of related loans, either by industry
classification or by borrower and "affiliate" groupings;
International lending exposure; and
Rapid movement into off-balance sheet activities and into
investment banking-related activities.'"9
The response to these and other concerns by the regulators has been an increased concern for enhanced capital
459. Id.
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adequacy requirement, upgrading of bank underwriting and
internal credit allocation processes, improvement of bank internal controls respecting such matters as insider, affiliate and
correspondent transactions and, in some instances, required
public disclosure of bank mismanagement.
In summary, not only federal regulations but also trends
evidenced in the examinations and supervision practices of
the regulators should be of concern to banking institutions.
Especially, there should be concern in the context of structuring and consummating a particular commercial loan transaction and, even more importantly, in the context of formulating, implementing and monitoring prudent, internal lending
practices and policies by such institutions and policies on alternative commercial, financial services.

